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The advent of our constitution necessitated a drastic re-evaluation of our 
aspirations as a young democratic state. Formal equality had to be accompanied by 
substantive equality. Substantive equality could only be achieved by a total revamp of 
our economic policy and framework, which was designed to benefit the white minority. 
The government quickly realized the fact that our competition jurisprudence had a 
significant role to play in bringing about economic and social reform. The challenge 
however was that the economy inherited ,was littered with monopolies. As a result in 
1995, the South African government embarked on a project to review competition policy 
and the process was concluded in September 1998 when Parliament passed the Act into 
law. 
The Act introduced new provisions, including the consideration of public interest 
in merger regulation. The inclusion of public interest in the Act was motivated by the 
need to address the socio-economic inequalities arising in society. Competitiveness and 
development was seeing as mutually supporting objectives. 
It was recognised that a small economy like South Africa, may be concentrated 
and therefore any merger and acquisition activity can create further concentration and 
social disparities ifleft unchecked. Mergers may lead to the shedding of jobs, especially 
where they are driven by cost saving and efficiency goals. Hence, it was recognised as 
being important that merger regulation consider the preservation of jobs where these 
arise as a result of the merger. In an economy with high unemployment rates, it would 
not serve the public interest to encourage or allow further job losses. Hence the inclusion 
of section 12 A 3 of the Competition Act which made it mandatory to consider public 
interest considerations in merger proceedings. This paper seeks to evaluate if 
competition authorities have carried out their mandate of addressing socio economic 
issue in merger processing through section 12 A (3). 
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South Africa is often regarded as a success story of the development and 
enforcement of competition law and policy in developing countries. South Africa's law 
and policy illustrate that it is possible to find a balance between the core focus on 
efficiency and broader public interest objectives which are of particular concern to 
developing countries.1 As a result South Africa has become a model to be followed by 
other developing countries. There is an explicit inclusion of efficiency-plus or broader 
development objectives in competition law and policy.2 Many competition lawyers and 
economists argue that the primary objective of competition law regimes is to promote 
economic efficiencl. Eleanor Fox echoes the same sentiments, she suggests that 
competition law, or antitrust law is typically a tool to preserve market competition in 
order to provide an environment that will encourage the efficiency and responsiveness of 
business and serve the interests of consumers 4• Th~ concept of efficiencies gives much 
greater importance to economic analysis. Furthermore greater importance is given to 
market power. It can be relied upon as a justification for an otherwise anti-competitive 
merger5. An anti -competitive merger would be approved if it could show that it will 
contribute to the improvement or promotion of technological or economic progress. This 
is captured in section 12 A (a) (i) of the Competition Act: 
'Section 12 A (a) (i) if it appears that the merger is likely to substantially 
prevent or lessen competition, then determine -
(i) whether or not the merger is likely to result in any technological, 
efficiency or other pro-competitive gain which will be greater than, and 
offset, the effects of any prevention or lessening of competition, that may 
1 http://www.npconline.co.za/ Competition Policy Review Trudi Hartzenberg, TRALAC 2003 18 
September 2014 
2 Ibid 
3 Damien Geradin, Efficiency Claims in EC Competition Law and Sector-specific Regulation, Paper 
prepared for the first workshop on comparative competition law. The evolution of European Competition 
law- Whose regulation and what regulationfile:I//C:/ Users/libuse/Downloads/SSRN-id617922.p 
4 Eleanor M. Fox, Equality, Discrimination, and Competition Law: Lessons from and for South Africa and 
Indonesia, 41 Harvard International Law Joumal579 (2000) 
5 Ibid 
result or is likely to result from the merger, and would not likely be obtained 
if the merger is prevented';6 
2 
According to a survey at the Organisation of Economic and Community 
Development (OECD") global forum, most developed countries show a shift away from 
the use of their competition laws to promote broad public interest objectives and focus 
instead on creating a framework for achieving the efficient use of resources and 
protecting freedom of economic activity in the market. In addition, public interest 
objectives usually fall within the mandate of a government minister or political decision-
making body. 7 
In developing countries, however, developmental goals often play a prominent 
role alongside the promotion and maintenance of competition, and the right to consider 
public interest concerns frequently vests in the country's competition authorities. It is 
against this backdrop that South Africa, as a developing country, should be considered. 
South Africa's political history and economic background have also had a definitive 
influence on its competition policy. 8 
Eleanor Fox states that: 
'South Africa's competition law does so as a result of the vast political 
changes in post-Apartheid society. In light of the decades of heinous, 
pervasive discrimination against the black majority of the population by the 
white minority, the new South African law and policy mandates pervasive 
action to redress economic imbalances throughout society. '9 
Public interest objectives are clearly articulated in South Africa's competition law. 
This paper will look at the use of Section 12 A (3) of the competition.Act to bring into 
effect the objectives of the act to address social and economic problems ofthe past 
through the public interest assessment in merger proceedings. The primary focus of 
discussion ofthis paper will be the Wal-Mart merger. 
6 Competition Act no 89 of 1998 
7 http://www.bowman.co.za/FileBrowser/ArticleDocuments/CompetitionLaw SG 3 of 2012, accessed 
on 14 November 2013 
8 Ibid 
9 Eleanor M. Fox, Equality, Discrimination, and Competition Law: Lessons from and for South Africa and 
Indonesia, 4 1 Harvard International Law Journal 579 (2000 
3 
Breakdown of this paper 
The dissertation will consist of five chapters and the content will comprise of the 
following: 
1. Chapter 1: will set out the introduction and will explore the history and the purpose 
of section 12 A (3) of the Competition Act and the Public interest criteria contained 
therein. 
2. Chapter 2: Will look at the application of the criteria by exploring the relevant case 
law. 
3. Chapter 3: Will look at the criticisms that have been levelled against the competition 
authorities in their application of section 12 A (3). 
4. Chapter 4: Will evaluate whether or not section 12 A (3) is achieving its original 
purpose of addressing social problems of the past through the public interest assessment 
in merger proceedings. 
5. Chapter 5: Will be a comparative analysis and final remarks. 
6. Chapter 6: Will make final remarks, recommendations and then proceed to conclude 
the discourse. 
1.1 The History and the background of the South African Competition law policy 
and framework 
South Africa has an economic legacy of state ownership protection, import 
substitution and economic isolation (as a result of sanctions), combined with strong 
property rights and well-developed markets that differentiate it from other developing 
countries. In addition, South Africa's history of racial discrimination had the effect of 
inter alia holding down the costs of labour for industries and shielding white farmers and 
businesses from competition which concentrated ownership in the hands of the white 
population. As a result of these factors, product markets and capital ownership in South 
Africa were highly concentrated in the past. In certain aspects, South Africa has a well-
4 
developed market economy, but there is also a need to reduce concentration in a number 
of markets, transform patterns of central ownership, and close the gap between a wealthy 
minority and a substantial majority that operate in a far less developed economic 
environment. Consequently, competition law performs a dual role in South Africa- in 
addition to stimulating competition and achieving market efficiency it also aims to be an 
instrument of economic transformation and address ''the historical economic structure 
and encourage broad based economic growth. 10 
Under apartheid, a very small number of conglomerate groupings effectively 
dominated the economy, with estimates that companies controlled by the Anglo 
American Corporation accounted for 43 percent of the JSE's capitalization11 • The high 
levels of market concentration and related competition challenges are largely due to the 
legacy of apartheid policies, which protected major corporations and built several 
important industries under state ownership, including Sasol and Iscor (now Arcelor 
Mittal SA)12. Trade protection was extensive, disparate, and the result of company 
lobbying. Most agricultural markets were regulated by control boards, while there was a 
government sanctioned cement cartel until 1996. 
The Mouton Commission in 1977 acknowledged the importance of competition 
issues and prompted the passing ofthe Maintenance and Protection of Competition Act 
in 1979 and the establishment ofthe Competition Board. However, this legislation made 
little impact on South Africa's competition problems. Following the end of apartheid, 
addressing the extent of market power became a key issue of policy debate, with 
competition policy reflected in the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Program, 
ultimately foreshadowing the Competition Act of1998.While ownership concentration 
has declined substantially over the past 15 years, patterns of merger activity, along with 
prohibited practices cases, suggest that many markets are highly concentrated a.nd that 
there has been vertical integration in many supply chains. This is notable in particular 
markets, such as food, construction, important intermediate industrial products including 




highlighted negative outcomes from low levels of competition in the form of high price 
mark-ups, which correlate with low productivity and employment growth.13 
1.2 Objectives of the Act 
South Africa' s competition policy objectives as set out in the preamble and 
section 2 of the Act are broad and take into account a variety of concerns. The preamble 
refers to the political background and motivations for the Act, including policies of 
equity, distribution and efficiency. It also states that the Act seeks to address past 
practices such as apartheid, which led to excessive concentration of ownership and 
control, inadequate restraints on anti-competitive trade practices, and unjust restrictions 
on full and fair participation in the economy. In addition, the Act recognises that 
liberalising trade and inviting foreign investment is an important factor in promoting 
competition. Thus it includes among its objectives the expansion of opportunities for 
South African participation in world markets and the role of foreign competition in 
South Africa as well as the creation of a capability and environment for South Africa to 
compete effectively in international markets. 14 
1.2.1 Objectives of the Act which speak to more developmental objectives include: 
• The promotion of employment and the advancement of the social and economic 
welfare of South Africans;15 
• Ensuring that small and medium enterprises have an equitable opportunity to 
participate in the economy; 16 
• Promotion of a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership 
stakes of historically disadvantaged persons and to provide all South Africans with an 
equal opportunity to participate in the economy; 17 and 
5 
• Regulation of the transfer of economic ownership in keeping with the public interest. 18 
13 Ibid 
14 Ibid 
15 Section 2 (c) of the competit ion Act no 89 of 1998 
16 Section 2 (e) of the Competition Act no 89 of 1998 
17 Section 2 (f) of the Competit ion Act no 89 of 1998 
Thus, the Act contains objectives focused at promoting a competitive economy 
and objectives that focus on furthering developmental goals and the public interest. The 
Competition Act of 1998, which came into force on 1 September 1999, reflected the 
commitment of South Africa's first democratic government to strengthen the 
competition regime in the context of the country's highly concentrated economy. 19 
1.3 The need for Competition authorities to play a part in transforming the 
economy 
6 
In 1999, the then Minister ofTrade and Industry, Mr Alec Erwin, emphasised the 
pivotal role that the competition authorities were to play in transforming "an economy 
inherited in 1994 that was rigid, protected, locked up in inefficient institutions, highly 
monopolised and concentrated". The high levels of concentration were evident in the 
patterns of ownership and control of companies listed on the Johannesburg Securities 
Exchange (JSEi0 . 
1.4 The advent of section 12 A (3)/ Public interest considerations in mergers 
Public interest considerations of the Act were a response to a specific set of 
historical and economic circumstances and were designed to encompass a wide-range of 
objectives, including certain objectives that speak to public interest and developmental 
aspects. The application of public interest objectives is relevant in relation to merger 
review proceedings, as this process involves a public interest aspect21• 
Since the promulgation of the Competition Act, 89 of 1998 ('the Competition 
Act'), and its corning into effect in September 1999, mergers (defined as the acquisition 
or establishment of control by one or more firms over the whole or part of the business 
of another firm) 22 that meet the prescribed monetary thresholds must be notified to and 
18 Ibid 
19 http://www.comptrib.co.zalassets/Uploads/Reports/unleasbing-rivalty.pdf, accessed on the 14 
November 2014 
20 Ibid 
2 1 Ibid 
22 Section 12 (1) (a) of the Competition Act no 89 of 1998 
7 
approved by the South African competition authorities before they may be implemented. 
23 
South African merger control has developed in leaps and bounds in 
sophistication, and international trends and norms are very closely ascribed to by the 
South African competition regulators. That said, South African merger control is also 
uniquely South African, in that analysis of both classic competition issues (the negative 
effect of a transaction on competitive conditions weighed against the efficiencies arising 
therefrom) and public interest issues (notably the impact of a transaction on 
employment) are called for by the statute. 24 
In summary, the provisions of s 12 A envisage three separate but interrelated inquiries, 
namely 
1. Whether or not the merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition; 
2. If the result of this inquiry is in the affirmative, whether technological, efficiency or 
other pro-competitive gains will trump the initial conclusion so reached in stage 1 
together, with the further consideration based on substantial public interest grounds, 
which in tum, could justify permitting or refusing the merger; and 
3. Notwithstanding the outcome ofthe enquiries in 1 or 2, the determination of whether 
the merger can or cannot be justified on substantial public interest grounds?5 
The legislature sets out specific public interest grounds ins 12 A (3): 
"(3) When determining whether a merger can or cannot be justified on 
public interest grounds, the Competition Commission or the Competition 
Tribunal must consider the effect that the merger will 
have on-
(a) a particular industrial sector or region; 
(b) Employment; 
(c) The ability of small businesses, or firms controlled or owned by 
historically disadvantaged persons, to become competitive; 
23 Section 11 (l)(a) of the Competition Act no 89 of 1998 
24 Ibid 
25 Section 12 A (3) ofthe Competition act no 89 of 1998 
8 
and 
(d) The ability of national industries to compete in international markets." 26 
In every merger, the competition authorities are required to consider "whether 
the merger can or cannot be justified on substantial public interest grounds" by assessing 
the effect that the merger, once implemented, will have on: (i) a particular industrial 
sector or region; (ii) employment; (iii) the ability of small businesses to compete; and 
(iv) the ability of national industries to compete in national markets. These 
considerations are designed to advance the developmental objectives incorporated in the 
Act of employment creation, economic transformation, and the development of small 
and medium-sized businesses27. Section 12 A (3) limited the scope of public interest by 
defining in detail the grounds on which public interest could be considered. By detailing 
the public interest the Act creates structure and provides a filter for the public interest 
analysis.28 
Section 12 A (3) carries with it a lot of historical implications, in that it seeks to 
address the competition imbalances of the past and seeks to bring about societal 
reformation through its consideration of public interest provisions. Section 12 A (3) 
which deals with merger proceedings is pragmatic and inclusive of all stakeholders such 
as unions, employees, members of the community, etc. Such a provisionis both 
necessary and impressive in that it is in line with the purport and the spirit of the 
constitution which seeks to create an environment that is based on equality (formal and 
substantive), dignity and freedom. 
1.5 Competition authorities carry out their functions independently 
The Competition Act placed the responsibility for public interest decisions at the 
hands of independent competition authorities. This has limited the scope for political 
interference. In addition, this particular feature reduced the likelihood that processes 
26 Section 12 (A) (3) of the competition act no 89 of 1998 
27 Ibid 
28 Authors: James Hodge, Sha'ista Goga, Tshepiso Moahloli, PUBLIC INTEREST PROVISIONS IN 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMPETITION ACT- A CRITICAL REVIEW, Competition Policy, Law and 
Economics Conference 2009, http://www.compcom.co.za, accessed on 19 November 2014 
9 
could be derailed through lobbying that might occur if political bodies had the discretion 
to overturn rulings on the basis of public interest considerations. This is especially true 
given the transparency and public nature of the competition processes defined by the 
Act. It is suggested that by allowing the same body to assess the competition and public 
interest aspects it allows for a weighing up of the relative merits ofboth aspects of the 
case. This particular feature allows the competition authorities to carry out their 
functions and responsibility without fear, favor and prejudice. The likelihood of 
impartiality is increased?9 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed a brief overview of the history of South Africa's 
competition law policy. It has further set out to state the developmental objectives of the 
Act. Furthermore it has introduced Section 12 A (3) of the competition Act and it has 
explained the role that it plays in bringing about redistributive justice for those who were 
previously marginalised. The public interest inquiry in the Act creates a structure and 
provides a filter for the public interest analysis. From the above discourse it is apparent 
that public interest considerations of the Act were a response to a specific set of 
historical and economic circumstances and were designed to encompass a wide-range of 




Application of the criteria 
2. Introduction 
Chapter 2 will outline and evaluate the application of the Section 12 A (3) 
criteria in merger proceedings by presenting how it has been interpreted by the 
Competition authorities. Although public interest objectives are articulated in South 
Africa's competition law, their exact interpretation comes with the development of the 
competition jurisprudence, as the case law amplifies and Clarifies the provisions in the 
Competition Act.30 
10 
Section 12 1 (b) of the Competition Act states that whenever required to consider 
a merger, the Competition Commission or Competition Tribunal must determine 
whether the merger can or cannot be justified on substantial public interest grounds by 
assessing the factors set ·out in subsection (3)31 
'Otherwise, determine whether the merger can or cannot be justified on 
substantial public interest grounds by assessing the factors set out in subsection (3)' 
Section 12 A (3) states that:["When determining whether a merger can. or cannot 
be justified on public interest grounds, the Competition Commission or the Competition 
Tribunal must consider the effect that the merger will have on -
(a) a particular industrial sector or region; 
(b) employment; 
(c) the ability of small businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically 
disadvantaged persons, to become competitive; and 
(d) the ability of national industries to compete in international markets.32" ] 
30 Trudi Hartzenberg, Competition Policy Review Page 2, TRALAC 2003 http://www.npconline.eo.za/ 
accessed on 18 September 2 0 14 
31 Competition Act of 1998 (Act No. 89 of 1998) 
32 Competition Act of 1998 (Act No. 89 of 1998) 
11 
2.1 The use of the word 'otherwise' 
The use of the word 'otherwise' has been interpreted by the Competition 
Tribunal as meaning that an evaluation of public interest must be undertaken whether the 
competition analysis has a positive or negative outcome33• In the merger between Anglo 
American and Kumba Resources34 the Tribunal found that 'the use of the word 
'otherwise' in section 12A(l)(b) means that the public interest evaluation must still be 
undertaken by the Competition Tribunal, regardless of the outcome of the section 
12A(2) 'competition' analysis.35The Tribunal has further stressed that the Act requires 
that all mergers must first undergo a competition evaluation and then be assessed on 
public interest grounds. This is so because even if a merger has failed the competition 
test, in that it substantially lessens competition, it can still be approved on the public 
interest test, if its anti-competitive effects are outweighed by its positive impact on the 
public interest. Similarly, a merger that has passed the competition test can still fail the 
public interest test and be prohibited. This means that a merger which does not 
substantially p:r:event or lessen competition may have conditions imposed upon it or may 
be prohibited because it impacts negatively the public interest. The application of section 
12 A (3) can be summed up in the case Distillers Corporation (SA) Limited and 
Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group Limited whereby the Tribunal argued that public 
interest factors can operate either to redeem an anticompetitive merger or impugn a 
merger deemed not anticompetitive. 36 
2.2 On what constitutes substantial 
The only considerations that have to be given are those of a substantial nature. 
Even though this requirement has been qualified and the public interest issues have been 
restricted to those provided in the act, it still poses a challenge to decide when public 
33 Authors: James Hodge, Sha'ista Goga, Tshepiso Moahloli, PUBLIC INTEREST PROVISIONS IN THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN COMPETITION ACT -A CRITICAL REVIEW Competition Policy, Law and 
Economics Conference 2009, http://www.compcom.co.za, accessed on 19 November 2014 
34 Case no. 46/LM/Jun02 
35 Ibid 
36 Competition Tribunal, Case no 08/LM/FEB02 
12 
interests are trivial especially where they have been raised37. The Act does not only 
require the Tribunal to assess public interest, buts 12 A (1) (b) requires that the public 
interest grounds should be 'substantial'. However, the Tribunal argues that the 
Competition Act does not provide further guidance in determining what constitutes 
'substantial' public interest.38 In the merger between Distillers Corporation and 
Stellenbosch Farmers Winery the Competition Tribunal noted that 'the legislation offers 
no criteria as a yardstick. In addition, they note in para 38 ofthe Shell-Tepco ruling that 
the Act 'does not otherwise guide us in balancing the competition and public interest 
assessments except insofar as section 12A(l)(b) requires that the public interest grounds 
should be substantial'. 
The Tribunal stated in Distillers Corporation and Stellenbosch Winery 
"How many jobs must be lost before one has grounds for substantial public interest? 
The legislature wisely does not seek to answer that for us, nor can we assume that it 
should be a uniformfigurefor all merger- it would depend on the context. "39 
2.2 The tribunal is only concerned with the residual public interest. 
Given the lack of guidance as to what constitutes substantial public interest, the 
Tribunal's approach is therefore to focus on 'residual public interest or that part that is 
not susceptible to or better able to be dealt with under another law, is substantial'. In 
practice the Tribunal has applied this to both historically disadvantaged persons and 
employment. 40 
In the Shell and Tepco merger, the Tribunal noted that its role is secondary in 
matters where there is already legislation. In paragraph 58 the Tribunal stated that 
37 Abigail Machine, Public interest and merger control in South Africa: The Walmart case revisited. 
Article submitted to the Department of Law at the University of Cape Town. http://africanantitrust.com. 
accessed on 18 January 2014 
38 Authors: James Hodge, Sha'ista Gaga, Tshepiso Moahloli PUBLIC INTEREST PROVISIONS IN THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN COMPETITION ACT -A CRITICAL REVIEW Competition Policy, Law and 
Economics Conference 2009, http://www.compcom.co.za, accessed on 19 November 2014 
39 Ibid 
40 Authors: James Hodge, Sha' ista Goga, Tshepiso Moahloli, PUBLIC INTEREST PROVISIONS IN 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMPETITION ACT-A CRITICAL REVIEW Competition Policy, Law and 
Economics Conference 2009, http://www. compcom.co.za. accessed on 19 November 2014 
'the role played by the competition authorities in defending even 
those aspects of the public interest listed in the Act is, at most, secondary to 
other statutory and regulat01y instruments in this case the Employment 
Equity Act, the Skills Development Act. ' 41 
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This point was further emphasized in the Distillers Corporation (SA) Limited and 
Stellenbosch Farmers Winery group Limited merger, where the Competition Tribunal 
argued that the 'parliament has in many instances enacted legislation that deals quite 
specifically with the issues referred to in section 12 A (3). In this case they note that 
'employment is no exception' . The Tribunal argued other legislation and institutions 
they create are 'better placed and resourced to deal directly and effectively with issues' 
and that would only intervene in cases where merger-specific losses were 'so adverse 
that no other law or regulator can remedy them' .42 
The Wal-Mart merger however seems to somewhat contradict and override the 
said assertions in that it took on responsibilities that many are of the view that they 
should have been considered by other fora. Many are of the view that the employment 
considerations in Wal-Mart should have been considered by the labour Court. This is 
further discussed in chapter 3 and 4 of this paper, 
2.3 Certain industries that are excluded jurisdiction of the competition authorities 
It should be noted that South Africa has excluded certain industries from the 
ambit and jurisdiction ofthe competition authorities. In a proposed merger between of2 
major banks, Nedcor-Stanbic merger, the court ruled that the Competition Act did not 
apply if an industry was subject to regulation43• 
41 1bid 
42 1bid 
43 Competition Law and Policy in South Africa, An OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-OPERATION 
and Development Peer Review, Substantive Issues: Content of the competition law Page 30 
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2.4 Public Interest analysis linked to its competition inquiry 
In Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited v Goldfields Limited44 Where The 
hostile take-over bid of Gold Fields Limited by Harmony Gold Mining Company 
Limited was conditionally approved. The Tribunal stated that the fundamental question 
to be answered in any public interest enquiry is whether the merger cannot be justified 
on public interest grounds.45 The Tribunal established that, in theory at least, the 
competition authorities could reach a conclusion regarding the approval of a merger on 
public interest grounds that was not the same as the conclusion reached on consideration 
ofthe competition issues. It was further submitted that 
'The public interest inquiry may lead to a conclusion that is the 
opposite of the competition one, but it is a conclusion that is justified not in 
and of itself, but with regard to the conclusion on the competition section. It 
is not a blinkered approach, which makes the public interest inquiry 
separate and distinctive from the outcome of the prior inquiry. It was also 
established that it is possible that a merger that will not be anti-competitive 
can be turned down on public interest grounds, but that does not mean that 
in coming to the conclusion on the latter, one will have no regard to the 
conclusion on the first. '46• 
Thus, Harmony instructs us that 'a blinkered approach' should not be applied to 
the public interest inquiry and that the Tribunal's public interest mandate is linked to its 
competition analysis.47 
2.5 Public interest evidential burden 
In Harmony/Goldfields it was also stated that when a substantial public interest 
concern has been raised, the merging parties bear the burden of justification. This means 





that the evidential burden shifts to the merging parties to rebut the net conclusion that a 
merger may not be justifiable on substantial public interest grounds48• 
2.6 Black economic empowerment 
Black economic empowerment (BEE) has featured significantly in some merger 
hearings. It is generally invoked when the merging parties argue that any anti-
competitive effects of their proposed merger are mitigated by its promotion of BEE. 
However, in the merger between Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Tepco Petroleum 
(Pty) Ltd49 in 2001, the Commission opposed a merger where a black-owned firm sold a 
struggling wholly owned subsidiary to Shell in exchange for a minority shareholding in 
Shell's distribution arm. The Commission recommended prohibition of the transaction 
on the grounds that it undermined BEE. However, the Tribunal approved the transaction 
because it found that there was no purpose to preventing the merger in order to keep a 
failing firm on life-support merely because it satisfied the BEE criterion. The Tribunal 
also pointed out that the owner of the target firm was itself a BEE entity that had decided . 
that its best commercial course lay in selling its subsidiary. 5° 
In Kansai v Freeworld51 the public interest conditions imposed on the merging 
parties by the Commission and confirmed by the Tribunal included that: (i) Freeworld 
must conclude a Black Economic Empowerment ("BEE") equity transaction within two 
years of the clearance date and (ii Freeworld must continue to manufacture all 
proprietary coatings currently manufactured in South Africa together with any 
complementary products for a period of ten years from the clearance date and continue 
to maintain and expand its current decorative and refinish automotive coatings 
operations in South Africa. 
The 'dti" made submissions to the Commission in respect of the merger and also 
applied for and was granted leave to intervene in the request for consideration 
proceedings (in respect of the divestiture condition imposed by the Commission) before 
48 Ibid 
49 (66/LM/OctOl) [2002] ZACT 13 (22 February 2002) 
50 Ibid 
5 1 53/AM/JUL11,109 
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the Tribunal. Even though the 'dti' ultimately withdrew from the request for 
consideration proceedings on the basis that the Commission would sufficiently represent 
its concerns, the dti's influence can be felt in the conditions imposed (the DTI's policies 
include promotion of economic transformation and local manufacturing) 52• 
Let it be noted that merger control may be used to promote statutory policies of 
general interest. One of these is expanding the business ownership stakes of historically 
disadvantaged persons 53• 
2. 7 Public interest analysis as it pertains to employment considerations. 
The proposed_Bonheur 50 General Trading (Pty) Ltd/Komatiland Forests (Pty) 
Ltd merger was blocked in 2004,54 partially to address the likely job losses of about 
1,200 workers, while the_Multichoice Subscriber Management (Pty) Ltd/Tiscali (Pty) 
Ltd55 merger in 2005 resulted in the imposition of conditions to limit job losses. A 
significant number of mergers have been approved with conditions aimed at minimising 
job losses. A novel condition imposed on the merger between Tiger Brands Ltd and 
Ashton Canning Company Ltd and Others56 in 2005, ensured that the merged entity 
fund skills training for retrenched seasonal farm workers in the Ashton community. As 
yet, the competition authorities have not prohibited a merger based solely on public 
interest grounds, but have made their decisions with reference to limiting the negative 
impact of mergers. 
Metropolitan Holdings Limited and Momentum Group Limited 57 is a landmark 
case in that it establishes the principle of connecting the relationship between job losses 
and efficiencies. The Tribunal conditionally approved the acquisition of 100% of the 
issued ordinary share capital of Momentum by Metropolitan. The Tribunal first assessed 
the competitive effects and concluded that the merger was unlikely to substantially 
prevent or lessen competition in any relevant potential market. The merger did however 
52Robert Legh, Jessica Staples and Magalie Masamba, Competition Law Sibergramme 3/2012,02 October 
2012, SG 3/2012, http://www.bowman.co.za. 14 November2014 
53 Ibid 
54 80/AM/OCT04) [2011] ZACT 53 (25 July 2011) 
55 (72/LM/Sep04) [2005] ZACT 23 (20 April2005) 
56 (46/LM/May05) [2005] ZACT 82 (23 November 2005) 
57 Case 41/LM/Jull 0 
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give rise to one public interest consideration, namely the loss of employment. Both firms 
were active in the broader fmancial services market. The merging parties submitted that 
the merger may lead to up to approximately 1000 job losses as a result of redundancies 
and the need to improve efficiencies in the post-merger entity. The Tribunal approved 
the merger subject to a limited moratorium on retrenchments for two years with terms 
that clarified the conditions on the merged entity.58 The parties sought to dispel concerns 
around these potential job losses by submitting that there was a plan to redeploy, retrain, 
offers of early retirement for affected staff members; natural attrition and business 
growth as mitigating factors. This, according to the parties, would reduce the number of 
potential job losses to 1000 from the earlier envisaged 1500 job cuts. 59 
The Tribunal's factual assessment revealed the importance of clearly articulating 
how the envisaged employment loss figures were determined and how these are linked 
to expected public (and not private) efficiencies post-merger.60 The Tribunal found that 
the parties were unable to show 'a rational connection between the efficiencies sought 
from the merge_r and the job losses claimed to be necessary ...... ' There. was a 
recognition, however, that this more considered approach to justifying j ob losses is only 
reserved for mergers where expected losses are of significant magnitude. 61 
It is the Tribunal's view that any negative impact on public factors cannot be 
arbitrarily arrived at without establishing a clear connection between the envisaged 
negative impact and whatever claimed efficiencies. Further, the Tribunal emphasized 
that while a negative impact on employment may be clearly connected to a particular 
claimed efficiency this does not discharge the parties of their duty to show that the 
employment losses can be justified for a reason that is public in nature to offset the 
public interest in preserving jobs as a result of the merger.62 
The Tribunal also tackled the issue of a joint and concerted effort between 
merging parties and labour unions in addressing employment losses as a result of a 
58 Ibid 
59 Ibid 
60 Njisane, Y. 201 , The rise of Public Interest: Recent high profile mergers, Public Interest Law Gathering. 
1- 24, Page 7, www.a{ricanlii.org, accessed on 15 May 2014 
6 1 Ibid 
62 Ibid 
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proposed merger. This, the Tribunal considered necessary in merger proceedings given 
that the Act makes provisions for special rights granted to labour63 • 
2.8 The assessment of mergers that may impact on national champions and a 
particular sector and region. 
Iscor Limited and Saldahna Steel (Pty) Lirnited64merger gives insight into the 
Tribunal's views on how to assess mergers that may impact on national champions and a 
particular sector and region.65This merger involved the acquisition, by Iscor Limited, of 
the remaining fifty percent shares owned the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) 
in Saldahna Steel. Iscor, at the time, was a major player in steel production in South 
Africa. Saldahna was a state-of-the-art mill that was to supply the export market from 
the port ofSaldahna. This particular acquisition entailed a change fromjoint to sole 
control by the acquiring firm. This move was brought about by a number of facts, chief 
amongst them being that the target firm stood the risk of failing and consequently 
implying significant losses for the two shareholders invested in the firm. The Tribunal's 
assessment of the competitive effects of the acquisition concluded that the failing firm 
concerns outweighed the loss to potential competition that would arise from the 
transaction. 66 
The Tribunal stated that a public interest analysis ought to be carried out despite 
the outcomes of the competitive effects analysis, the Tribunal proceeded to evaluate the 
impact of the acquisition on public interest. They found that if the merger was not 
approved it would have had adverse effects on public interest. 67 
The evidence presented before the Tribunal indicated that the Saldahna Steel 
plant was a crucial part of the town's economic life and that its closure would not only 
affect its employees given the resulting of employment but also all the firms and 
individuals whose livelihood depended on its functioning. Given the small size of the 
63 Ibid 
64 Case no: 67/LM/DecO 1 
65 TN Njisane, Y. 201, The rise of Public Interest: Recent high profile mergers, Public Interest Law 
Gathering. 1-24, Page 7, www.a{ricanlii.org, accessed on 15 may 2014 
66 Ibid 
67 Ibid 
region and its dependence on a small number of industries, the effect of the plant 
closure, according to the Tribunal, would be devastating. Furthermore, the Tribunal 
noted the firm's contribution to community development through its social programs 
that contributed to the upliftment of the region.68Given this, the Tribunal found that 
indeed the public interest favours the approval of the acquisition. 
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The Tribunal proceeded to examine the impact of the acquisition on 'the ability 
of national industries to compete in international markets' or commonly referred to as 
national champions. In assessing this public interest, the Tribunal largely relied on 
evidence presented to it by the Department of Trade and Industry, the custodians of 
industrial and trade development. This aspect of the merger indeed highlights the issue 
of competition policy being part of a suite of economic instruments used by government 
to achieve its economic development imperatives69• 
The Department of Trade and Industry's arguments centered on the acquiring 
finn being able to expand its productive capacity in order to better compete with much 
larger firms in the international market. Further the Department of Trade and Industry 
argued that were Iscor to become a lower cost producer, this will be to the benefit of the 
downstream steel industry thereby making Iscor's customer competitive as well. While 
wary of this argument the Tribunal nevertheless approved the transaction noting that this 
was not a subject they ought to make a pronouncement on for the purposes of the merger 
before them. 70 
Indeed while acknowledging that the acquisition embodied anti-competitive 
effects given its removal of Saldahna as a potential competitor to Iscor, the failing firm 
defense raised by the parties outweighed these potential effects. Further the public 
interest also necessitated the approval of the merger as a prohibition would have resulted 
• • • '71 
m even d1re consequences.·· 





72 [2011] 1 CPLR 145 (CT) 
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The merger between W al-Mart and Massmart is an example of a transaction 
where the public interest inquiry occurred even though the merger raised no competition 
concerns. The Tribunal confirmed in Wal-Mart v Massmart: 
"One ofthe unusual features of the Competition Act, 1998 (Act 89 of 1998, 
as amended) ('the Act') is that despite the fact that a merger may raise no 
competition concerns, it may still be susceptible to prohibition, or approval 
subject to conditions, on public interest grounds. "73 
On 27 September 2010, Massmart announced that Wal-Mart intended to acquire 
a controlling interest in Massmart by virtue of an acquisition of 51% of the ordinary 
share capital ofMassmart. The Economic Development Department ("EDD") took a 
particular interest in the Wal-Mart v Massmart transaction. After Wal-Mart's 
announcement of the merger and notification to the Commission, the Economic 
Development Department appointed an expert panel to conduct research on the 
implications of the proposed merger, which reported that owing to the size and 
international exposure ofWal-Mart, the transaction would impact on employment, the 
welfare oflocal manufacturers, and small businesses74• The Economic Development 
Department engaged directly with the parties and, on failing to obtain any binding 
commitments from them, ultimately intervened in the Tribunal proceedings. During the 
proceedings, the "EDD" made submissions on the impact of the proposed transaction on 
procurement and expressed the concern that the transaction would result in a shift away 
from the merged entity purchasing the products of South African manufacturers to the 
products of low cost foreign (particularly Asian) producers. 
The transaction between Wal-Mart Stores Inc of the United States ('Walmart') 
and South African retailer Massmart Holdings Limited ('Massmart') was conditionally 
approved by the Tribunai during May 2011. The Tribunal heid that it was common cause 
that the merger did not raise any competition concerns, in that Wal-Mart did not 
compete with Massmart in South Africa and its only presence in this country was its 
procurement arm ofiPL which did no more than purchase South African produce for an 
73 Ibid 
74 Robert Legh, Jessica Staples and Magalie Masamba, Competition Law Sibergramme 3/2012, 02 
October 2012, SG 3/2012, http://www.bowman.co.za, accessed on 14 November 2014 
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export market. Accordingly, the Tribunal found that the transaction did not prevent or 
lessen competition in any of the markets in which Massmart operate. The entire dispute 
therefore turned on what was described by the Tribunal as 'one of the unusual features' 
of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (''the Act"), that is the public interest concerns as set 
out ins 12 A ofthe Act. In particular, s 12 A (3) read together with s 12 A (1) provides 
that the initial consideration of the merger must consist of an examination of whether the 
merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition by an examination of the 
factors set out ins 12 A (2). Once that enquiry has been completed, and if it then appears 
that the merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition, a determination 
must be made whether or not the merger is likely to result in any technological, 
efficiency or other pro-competitive gain which Will be greater than the losses and thus 
offset the effects of the prevention or lessening of competi~ion that has already been 
found to exists pursuant to the initial enquiry. Further, and irrespective of the findings in 
relation to these considerations, the Competition Commission or Tribunal must consider 
whether the merger can or cannot be justified on substantial public interest grounds. The 
Tribunal found that, given the ambitions ofMassmart to expand, the merger may well 
expedite expansion and new jobs would be likely to be created more quickly. Hence it 
concluded: 
"On balance, retrenchments are. post-merger, a possibility, but the 
more likely scenario is that either the workforce size will remain constant or 
will expand "75 
Whatever the disputes between the commitments of the merging parties and the 
concerns expressed by the unions, the Tribunal was satisfied with the undertakings given 
by the merging parties that there would be no retrenchments based on the merged 
entity's operational requirements in Sout.h. Africa, resulting from the merger, for a period 
of two years from the effective date of the transaction, were sufficient to meet any 
objection that could justifiably have been raised on the available evidence. The argument 
was raised both by the Ministers and the unions that the result of the merger would be a 
significant shift in purchasing away from South African manufacturers towards foreign 
75 Ibid 
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low costs Asian producers, which would in turn have a significant impact upon small 
and medium sized businesses within South Africa and a further consequent loss of jobs. 
Having analysed this evidence, the Tribunal concluded that, notwithstanding a 
legitimate concern which had been raised with regard to the effect of the merger upon 
local producers and jobs, the possible consequent job losses had to be weighed •against 
the consumer interest in lower prices and job creation at Massmart. Since the evidence is 
that the likely consumers, who will benefit most from the lower prices associated with 
the merger, are low income consumers and those consumers without any means of 
support of their own, thus the poorest of South Africans, the public interest in lower 
prices is no less compelling'. 
The Tribunal then turned to the conditions which had been sought by the unions, 
in particular certain procurement conditions. The Tribunal found that in order to impose 
procurement conditions, there would be a need to determine the local procurement levels 
ofMassmart pre-merger and then hold it to this level for some period in the future. It 
held that 'this all sounds -fme at the level of principle, but ... founders when we get to the 
level of detail'. The Tribunal further held that it would be extremely difficult to 
establish the amount oflocally produced product supplied which is actually produced 
locally. Further, there was no rational basis for determining the period in which the 
procurement conditions should operate. In addition, the proposed conditions, in the 
Tribunal's view, would create an unjustified symmetry; that is the merged entity would 
be the only firm subjected to this restriction, while its rivals would be free to procure 
globally. In addition, the procurement condition would be impermissible as it would 
render the country in breach of trade obligations under several international trade 
agreements to which South Africa was a party. In the result, the Tribunal found that the 
remedies proposed by the u..nions were far too complex and imprecise. 
It held that the proposal of the merging parties to establish a programme aimed 
exclusively at the development of local South African supplies, including small and 
medium size enterprises and funded in the fixed amount of R 1 00 million to be 
contributed by the merged entity over a three year period, was both appropriate, 
proportional and enforceable. 
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The merging parties initially sought the unconditional approval of the proposed 
transaction (which transaction was widely accepted to yield no competition law 
concern), the Tribunal opted to impose conditions (offered voluntarily by the merging 
parties) to its approval intended to protect certain specified public interest 
considerations, in particular employment and the ability of small, historically 
disadvantaged businesses to compete effectively. 
Notwithstanding the decision of the Tribunal, which included conditions deemed 
to adequately address the potential impact on the aforementioned public interest 
considerations, SACCA WU, a trade union that had originally intervened in the Tribunal 
proceedings, sought and was granted leave to appeal the decision of the Tribunal to the 
CAC on the basis that the merger would be to the detriment of public interest and the 
Ministers ofEconomic Development, Trade and Industry and Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (collectively 'the Ministers') sought to review and set aside the decision of the 
Tribunal. 
In its consideration of the appeal, the CAC indicated that the arguments raised by 
SACCA WU were insufficient to require the prohibition of the merger. While it was 
unable to conclude with a degree of precision the public interest benefits to which the 
merger would give rise, it stated that the pro-competitive benefits likely to result from 
the merger would countervail any alleged anti-competitive effect thereof. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the CAC required the merging parties to reinstate 503 
employees, which SACCA WU had argued were retrenched to incentivise the conclusion 
of the merger. In addition, the CAC requested greater clarity from the merging parties 
pertaining to the establishment and development of a programme to support local South 
African suppliers. 
The Tribunal imposed an undertaking (tendered by the merging parties) that the 
merging parties would establish a programme for the development of South African 
suppliers including small and medium enterprises for a fixed amount of Rl 00 million, to 
be contributed and expended within three years of the effective date of the order. On 
appeal before the CAC), the CAC amended this condition ~o impose an obligation on the 
parties to commission a study by three experts (to be appointed by the trade unions, the 
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government and the merging parties) to determine the most appropriate means and 
mechanism by which local South African suppliers could be empowered to respond to 
the challenges of the merger. When the inquiry was done and the court was satisfied 
with the inquiry, it altered the order of the development fund and ordered that a sum of 
R200 million be effected towards development of the small scale businesses and that the 
operation should run for a period of five years. This was the final judgment passed on 9 
October 2012.76The progress of this development fund is discussed in chapter 4. 
There are two very important principles that were stated in Wal-Mart that should 
be appreciated when carrying out a public interest analysis, namely that: 
2.9.1 Firstly, Public interest considerations must be merger specific 
A further consideration is that the public interest must be merger specific. 
Expressed in less technical language, unless the merger is the cause of the public interest 
concerns, we have no remit to do anything about them77• Tribunal commented that 
'Our job [as the Tribunal] in merger control is not to make the world 
a better place, only to prevent it becoming worse as a result of a specific 
. ' 78 transactzon . 
The competition authorities have traditionally taken the view that despite the 
diverse objectives included in the Act, the public interest provisions of the Act ought to 
be narrowly interpreted; 79 
2.9.2 Secondly, The role of the competition Authorities is to protect existing rights 
as opposed to creating new rights 
This was expressed in the following quote: 
76 Abigail Machine, Public interest and merger control in South Africa: The Walmart case revisited. 
Article submitted to the Department of Law at the University of Cape Town. http://africanantitrust. com, 
accessed on 18 January 2014 
77 Ibid 
78 [2011] 1 CPLR 145 (CT) 
79 Ibid 
'Whilst in this case protecting existing collective rights is a 
legitimate concern that our public interest mandate allows us to intervene on 
because we are protecting existing rights from the apprehension that they 
may be eroded post-merger, we must be careful how far down this path we 
go. Protecting existing rights is legitimate, creating new rights is beyond our 
competence.' 
2.10 When public interest factors may lead to opposing conclusions 
25 
It should be noted that public interest consideration may lead to conflicting 
conclusions. In Distillers Corporation (SA) Limited and Stellenbosch Farmers Winery 
Group Limited80 the Tribunal noted that there may be instances where public interest 
factors may lead to opposing conclusions. By way of example, the Tribunal averred that 
a negative employment effect may be countered by a positive effect on a particular 
region in that in order to keep a factory open may require that substantial jobs be lost. 
Other instances include a situation where the merger is required to save a failing firm; in 
order to be competitive cost reductions in the form of job cuts are required; and a lower 
cost base, which will result in lower prices for consumers, can only be achieved by job 
cuts81 . A similar view was echoed in the Harmony Gold matter where the Tribunal also 
noted that it is possible that public interest factors do not point to the same conclusion82• 
By way of example a merger could give rise to employment losses (negative 
effect) whilst creating a national champion (positive effect). Therefore there is an 
intrinsic requirement that the Tribunal perform a balancing act of these conflicting 
factors before reaching a net conclusion on public interest. The W almart/Massmart 
matter builds on this and pits negative public interest effects against consumer welfare 
enh&J.cing outcomes at-ising from a merger. Indeed there was an agreement by all parties 
concerned that there were cognizable consumer welfare effects arising from the merger 
in the form of lower prices that would affect the most vulnerable of consumers. What 
8° Case no. 08/LM/February 2002, 19 April2001 
81 Willem Boshoff, Daryl Dingley & Janine Dingle, The economics of public interest provisions in South 
African competition policy, 6th Annual Conference on Competition Law, Economics and Policy, 6 & 7 
September 2012, http://www.compcom.co.za, Accessed on the 14th of November 2014 
82 [2005] 2 CPLR 484 (CT) 
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then of these potential consumer welfare enhancing effects when pitted against a 
negative impact on public interest? Indeed it seems to me that the balancing act required 
necessitates a strict application of the law on the facts of the case and most importantly 
raises the issue of merger-specificity as a guiding principle in the assessment of public 
interest as applied in the competition evaluation83• 
Conclusion 
·This essay has endeavored to display how section 12 A (3) is applied in merger 
proceedings as it relates to public interest factors. It has explored its role in championing 
the rights of employees, creating national champions, the protection of particular 
industrial sector or region and the protection of small businesses and previously 
disadvantaged individuals. This paper also explored the meaning of the word 
'substantial' found in section 12 A (1) (b). It was stated that the Competition Act does 
not guide us in balancing the competition and public interest assessments except insofar 
as section 12 A (1) (b) requires that the public interest grounds should be substantial. 
Furthermore, from the above discussion we ·can deduce that section 12 A (3) can operate 
either to redeem an anti-competitive merger or impugn a merger deemed not anti-
competitive. It was also stated that a public interest analysis ought to be carried out 
despite the outcomes of the competitive effects analysis. This makes the public interest 
provision a peremptory provision which has to be adhered to at all costs. Furthermore it 
was stated in the case law discussed that the public interest analysis is not a blinkered 
approach, which makes the public interest inquiry separate and distinctive from the 
outcome of the prior inquiry. A further consideration is that the public interest must be 
merger specific. It was further stated that the purpose of section 12 A 3 is to protect 
existing rights and not necessarily creating new rights. The competition authorities 
rightly stated that such a feat is beyond their competence. It is further interesting to note 
that the competition authorities are unlikely to prohibit a merger that is not anti-
competitive, on public. interest grounds. It is suggested that the most important effect of 
83 Hodge J, Goga S, Moahloli T, PUBLIC INTEREST PROVISIONS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
COMPETITION ACT- A CRITICAL REVIEW, Competition Policy, Law and Economics Conference 
2009, http://www.compcom.co.za, accessed on 19 November 
the public interest criteria has been that the authorities frequently approve mergers 
subject to conditions that promote public interest. 
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Chapter 3 




Section 12 A (3) of the Competition Act has been the subject of much academic 
debate from competition law experts. Chapter 3 will lay out some of those criticisms and 
then proceed to do an evaluation of same. It will then proceed to give an opinion on 
whether or not the criticism is valid. It must be noted that the Wal-Mart merger will 
form the crux of our discussion in this chapter. 
3.1. Taking public interest too far: Wal-Mart 
The competition authorities are mandated by the empowering provision to 
protect existing public interest rights and not to seek to create rights. If the Competition 
authorities seek to create rights that were not present before the merger then they have 
exceeded their jurisdiction. The Wal-Mart!Mass-Mart merger has come under 
considerable criticism for over stepping their powers in that they sought to protect one of 
the union's rights as the main union representative. 
"The merged entity must honour existing labour agreements and 
must continue to honour the current practice of the Mas smart Group not to 
challenge SACCAWU's current position, as the largest representative union 
within the merged entity, to represent the bargaining units for at least three 
(3) y ears .from the effective date ofthe transaction "84 
It is submitted that this condition does raise serious concerns. It requires further 
exploration of whether the competition authorities' mandate to consider employment 
84 (Minister of Economic Development and Others v Competition Tribunal and Others; South African 
Commercial,Catering and Allied Workers Union v Walmart Stores Inc and Another [201 2] 1 CPLR 6 
(CAC) ('Minister').para 172 in para 2.1.3 of the CAC order) 
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issues during the merger review process extends to imposing a condition of this nature85• 
The Competition Act specifically excludes from its ambit certain labour practices that 
may at face value appear to be anti-competitive, in recognition of the social importance 
of these practices and their value in promoting and protecting the interests of employees. 
Consequently, sections 3(a) and (b) specifically exclude the employment law practices 
of collective bargaining and collective agreements. 86 
'Section 3. Application of Act 
(1) This Act applies to all economic activity within, or having an effect 
within, the Republic, except-
(a) Collective bargaining within the meaning of section 23 of the 
Constitution, and the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act No. 66 of 1995); 
(b) a collective agreement, as defined in section 213 of the Labour Relations 
Act, 1995' 
The competition authorities consider the effect of a particular merger on 
employment, and, in doing so, are required to bear in mind the extent to which it is 
appropriate for them to advance employment-related interests during a merger. It is not 
clear from the Competition Act or from existing case law how far the competition 
authorities' mandate to consider employment-related issues extends.87 
With regard to the competition authorities' mandate to consider employment-
related issues in terms of section 12A(3) of the Competition Act, the Tribunal has 
recognised that the most powerful instruments available to the unions to address any 
such issues that arise during competition proceedings are usually the Labour Relations 
Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) or private collective bargaining agreements88• The authorities' 
involvement should accordingly be limited to bala11cing the effect on competition and 
85 Jessica Staples, Mike Holland, Jannie Rossouw, Taking public interest too far: Walmart Stores Inc v 
Massmart Holdings Ltd, SA Mercantile Law Journal, 2013, Volume Number: Vol2, Issue 1, Pages 94-
106 
86 Ibid 
87 Jessica Staples, Mike Holland, Jannie Rossouw, Taking public interest too far: Walmart Stores Inc v 
Massmart Holdings Ltd, SA Mercantile Law Journal, 2013, Volume Number: Vol2, Issue 1, Pages 94-
106 
88 Ibid 
employment, as this falls outside the scope of the LRA and collective bargaining 
instruments. 89 
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It is submitted that the authorities erred in not applying this reasoning to the 
imposition of the condition that requires the merged entity to recognise SACCA WU as 
the largest representative trade union for a period ofthree years after the merger. 
It is further submitted that the position of SACCA WU within the merged entity 
appears to be an issue that falls more appropriately within the scope of bargaining 
instruments and the Labour Relations Act and accordingly ought to be enforced in these 
forums instead. As such, the competition authorities went beyond their scope and 
intruded into employment law to an inappropriate extent in the W almart condition90• 
3.2 The competition authorities give effect to interests that extend beyond the scope 
of the Act 
It is submitted that the conditions imposed in Kansai v Freeworld, Wal-Mart v 
Massmart and Pioneer v Pannar give effect to interests that extend beyond the scope of 
the Act.91The Pioneer v Pannar is discussed in chapter 4 of this paper. 
It is stated that the condition that called for the establishment of training and 
development programmes that will assist SMME's and previously disadvantaged persons 
in trading with Wal-Mart, while framed as falling within the ambit "of harm to the 
public interest in employment, industry sectors, BEE business and small business" is a 
far stretch from the listed public interest ground. It is further stated that public interest 
listed in the competition act are better suited to a narrow interpretation and should be 
considered only to the extent that they relate to competition law and in general and there 
is no other appropriate mechanism for pursuing such policy objectives. Certain 
competition law experts say that though public interest must continue to play a role in 
merger analysis in South Africa, the competition authorities are still required to act 
89 (Unilever Plc v Competition Commission & CEPPWA WU [2001-2002] CPLR 336 {CT) para 43). 
90 Jessica Staples, Mike Holland, Jannie Rossouw, Taking public interest too far: Walmart Stores Inc v 
Massmart Holdings Ltd, SA Mercantile Law Journal, 2013, Volume Number: Vol 2, Issue 1, Pages 94-
106 
91 Ibid 
within the scope oftheir powers and should not be pushed into pursuing government 
objectives that fall outside this92. 
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In Kansai/Freeworld government (Department of Trade and Industry and EDD) 
entered into direct discussions with the merging parties and proposed conditions, inter 
alia, in relation to employment, BEE and investment in the local industry. The 
competition authorities approved the merger with the above mentioned conditions. 
These conditions are arguably more aligned with the interests of third party interveners 
in the merger review process than the developmental objectives in the Act, which 
previous decisions have indicated ought to be interpreted with circumspection. The 
conditions imposed Exceed the ambit of the legislated public interest grounds contained 
in section 12 A (3) of the competition Act. Such an approach undermines the appropriate 
role of competition law and overlooks legislation and other bodies created to facilitate 
the achievement of these public interest objectives.93 
It is submitted that such an approach from Competition Authorities is both 
beneficial and disadvantageous.94 In that you have the objectives of the Act with regard 
to public interest being given effect to through the merger proceedings, however in the 
same regard you fmd that the courts often extend beyond the province of the 
Competition Act and into the province of other legislation. A balance has to be struck 
between giving effect to the objectives of the Act and stepping into the terrain of other 
legislation. 
I am of the view that proceedings should also not be solely occupied with the 
interest of third party interveners. Such could have the harmful impact of hindering 
commercial traffic and detract foreign direct investment. The Act's objectives recognise 
the importance of creating opportunities for foreign investment and the imposition of 
onerous conditions thai are likely to deter investors is counter-productive to the 
achievement of this objective. Many foreign investors are observing our current 
competition trends and we have to be cautious that we do not place undue difficulty on 





foreign investors. In February, a senior vice president at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
said on a trip to South Africa that many U.S. investors had been watching the response 
by the South African government to Wal-Mart's entry before deciding whether to enter 
the country themselves.95 
A fine balance needs to be struck between the Act's developmental objectives 
and the need to create an environment that will be conducive to commercial expansion 
and direct foreign investment. 96A narrow, merger-related application of the public 
interest provisions in the Act has previously been considered the most effective way to 
promote transactions that are beneficial to the economy while still protecting the public 
interest, thus fulfilling both the competition-related and the imposition of onerous 
conditions that are likely to deter investors is counter-productive to the achievement of 
this objective97. It is submitted that such an approach protects the public interest, thus 
fulfilling both the competition-related and developmental objectives of the Act. 
3.3 Concerns that competition authorities may not be exercising their public 
interest mandate independently 
There is also a growing concern that the competition authorities may not be 
exercising their public interest mandate independently but are giving in to pressure from 
interveners promoting their own interests and policies. This is of great concern and such 
can defeat the whole purpose of the competition Act. We need all stakeholders and in 
particular merging parties to have a certain level of confidence in the Competition 
authorities98. In order to enforce and promote competition effectively, as envisaged by 
the Act, it is important that the competition authorities are perceived as "independent 
institutions to monitor economic competition". Perceptions that the independence ofthe 
competition authorities is under threat is therefore exceedingly damaging to the 
95 Micaela Flores-Arraoz and Vas Musca , Walmart in South Africa: The good, the bad and the ugly, 17 
October 2011. http://www.consultancyafrica.com/, Accessed on the 18 November 2014 
96 Ibid 
97 Ibid 
98 Ibid Claire A vidon and Claudio Azzarito, Being pushed to promote government policies, Without 
Prejudice, February 2012 
competition authorities' role as the enforcers ofthe objectives of competition policy in 
South Africa.99 
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Government's "arbitrary" intervention on the basis of its "industrialisation" 
objectives has raised a serious concern amongst competition experts. This. is illustrated 
in Kansai/Freeworld. This clearly goes against the process set in place. This is clearly an 
irregularity on the part of the government. The government should ensure that they . 
comply with the Act and allow for the competition authorities to perform their statutory 
mandate without fear of any arbitrary government intervention. In Kansai/Freeworld, 
government apparently pushed for a condition that required investment in decorative 
coatings research and development and in respect of employment, although no direct 
impact on employment was envisaged, government apparently insisted on the 
monitorium. In this case, the competition authorities agreed to conditions around the 
development oflocal manufacturing. The details of these conditions, agreed between 
government and the transacting parties were not part of the public record. However, an 
attempt to commit the firms to a part:icular allocation of resources, even if agreed upon, 
place constraints on the firms and it becomes difficult to arrange their production in the 
least costly method, to be productively efficient. Under different economic conditions, 
these arrangements may no longer be viable, forced constraints prevent the firm from 
responding appropriately. This mode of intervention whereby merging parties engage 
directly with government raises questions regarding transparency and accountability and 
arguably challenges the independence ofthe competitioninstitutions100. 
This type of arbitrary intervention was replicated in the Wal-Mart!Massmart 
transaction. It is said that when the deal was announced, the Minister of Economic 
Development established an expert panel to provide advice on the impact of the 
transaction. The panel apparently reported to the Minister that it was "probable that, 
owing to the size and international exposure ofWal-Mart, employment, the welfare of 
local manufacturers and small businesses would be seriously affected". According to 
Lewis (2012), the advice was opaque and from an administrative law perspective 
99 Ibid 
100 Willem Boshoff, Daryl Dingley & Janine Dingle, The economics of public interest provisions in South 
African competition policy. 6th Annual Conference on Competition Law, Economics and Policy, 6 & 7 
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inappropriate. Furthermore, it is also suggested that the Department of Economic 
Development also contacted the merging parties prior to the filing of the transaction as 
well as various stakeholders in order to solicit their views on the transaction. The 
Minister of Economic Development therefore created an impression that- "if you want 
the merger to be approved speak to the Minister" and the Minister "can leverage and 
hold-up the process". There was thus no systematic approach to the issues raised and no 
transparency in the process. Government effectively proceeded with a parallel process to 
the competition authorities, which is arguably an inappropriate way to conduct policy. In 
addition, government's fixation with foreign companies owning domestic firms as well 
as the impact in local procurement reflects governments "industrialisation" policy which 
falls outside the scope of the public interest provisions in the Competition Act. Such 
behavior is uncalled for and a travesty of justice. Such actions will only serve to cast 
aspersions over the competition process. It is important that competition law and that the 
competition authorities are not seen as another tool of government. 101 
3.4 Certain government ministries have been accused of being too paternalistic. 
This may be evidenced by arbitrary nature of the intervention by Department of 
Mineral and Energy in the merger involving shell and Tepco102• In that it was attempting 
to decide what was in the best interests of Thebe without proper consultation or 
consideration on the ultimate effects of its intervention103 • It is also reported that parties 
often times are under political or other pressures and that most undertakings are often 
elicited rather than being voluntary104• This is evidenced by the Wal-Mart merger and 
the Kansai merger. Such acts have the effect of undermining the competition process in 
place and casting aspersions over the merger evaluation process. 
101 Ibid 
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3.5 The question as to whether the competition authorities are the right institutions 
to balance welfare and public interest considerations. 
Another issue that has arisen relates to the suitability of competition authorities 
to deal with public interest. There is an emerging view in the South African context that 
suggests that public interest consideration is best left to other agencies better equipped to 
deal with such issues: 105 It is stated that a competition authority may not be the right 
body to balance competing considerations as it may not possess the most effective and 
efficient means for achieving these objectives. For example, in circumstances where a 
merger impacts on a remote area with high unemployment levels, the competition 
authorities are unlikely to be well suited to effectivety evaluate the indirect and direct 
economic effects of the merger on the region. This particular view was supported by the 
Competition authorities in the Tepco merger. It was stated in the merger between Shell 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd ("SSA") and Tepco Petroleum106 that the role played by the 
competition authorities in defending even those aspects of the public interest listed in the 
Act is, at most, se'?ondary to other statutory and regulatory instruments - i:n this case the 
Employment Equity Act and the Skills Development Act. The competition authorities, 
however well intentioned, were well advised not to pursue their public interest mandate 
in an over-zealous manner less they damage precisely those interests that they ostensibly 
seek to protect. 107 
I do not agree with the assertion that the competition authorities are not the right 
institutions to balance welfare and public interest considerations. The competition 
authorities act in a mamier that is in the ambit of their responsibility. Competition 
authorities are acting pursuant to an empowering provision, namely section 12 A (3), the 
preamble and section 2 that contains the objectives of the Act. I think that a more 
legitimate question to ask is whether or not they have over-stepped their jurisdiction and 
treaded upon the sphere of another. The competition authorities have the capacity and 
the competence to fulfil their statutory obligations of considering section 12 A (3). The 
105 Ibid 
106 Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd ("SSA") and Tepco Petroleum (Pty) Ltd ("Tepco") (Case No. 
66/LM/OctO 1 ). 
107 Ibid 
competition authorities have shown themselves a more than competent arbiter in 
competition matters and public interest matters that directly impact on competition. 
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Furthermore there is a need to achieve uniformity of approach as it relates to 
mergers for the concerned stakeholders such as unions. It would prove to be a 
complicated process if a stakeholder had to have multiple proceedings over one matter 
of contention. With all its flaws, it is surely preferable to allow for the simultaneous 
consideration of competition and public interest issues by the competition authorities in 
the course of analysing a merger. As David Lewis noted in May 2002, 
'For one authority to take a decision on competition grounds, and 
another to take the public interest decision, would invite massive lobbying, 
and would lack the openness and transparency of our unified process. The 
single, unified forum, and the holistic inquiry that accompanies it, allows for 
the imposition of conditions~ either to protect the public interest where a 
pro-competitive merger would otherwise be prohibited due to its negative 
impact on public interest, or to protect competition where an otherwise anti-
competitive merger is approved due to its positive public interest impact. 
The alternative would be a bifurcated, disjointed and uncoordinated 
consideration of these issues '108 
David Lewis further states that allowing political organisations or other public 
institutions to handle public interest issues may unnecessarily result in competition 
issues being totally ignored out of the equation. Given the power that these organisations 
have for example the department of trade and industry, compared to the competition 
authorities, this is more likely to result in competition issues being sacrificed. It is 
important that policy makers or authorities applying public interest test do so in a 
manner which is independent from poiitical influence109 • 
The competition authorities' public interest mandate is not divorced from their 
competition analysis: the factors are analysed with regard to one another, in a holistic 
108 Ibid 
109 Abigail Machine, Public interest and merger control in South Africa: The Wahnart case revisited. 
Article submitted to the Department of Law at the University of Cape Town. http://africanantitrust.com, 
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inquiry, in which the competition assessment has relevance to the question of 
justification in respect of the public interest inquiry. 110 The competition authorities have 
to exercise great caution and discretion and always bear in mind that each public interest 
element is also protected by legislation and institutions created specifically for this 
purposelll. 
The Tribunal dealt with this question in the Metropolitan/Momentum merger. It 
contended that the inclusion of employment considerations in a merger, albeit secondary 
to other statutes as was found in the Shell and Tepco, was essential given that the task 
competition authorities are charged with is different from statutes such as the 
Employment Equity Act among others. In this, the Tribunal argued that while a labour 
tribunal may be tasked with the determination of the operational requirements of a firm 
and the fairness of the process in relation to affected employees they, on the other hand, 
have a different mandate. This essentially involves determining whether the merger, 
which will give rise to the operational circumstances should have been cleared in the 
:first place. This differs from the considerations made by labour agencies that mainly 
focus on the fairness of the process in relation to the affected employeesu2. 
Abigail Machine argues that while it may be true that there is an overlap of 
responsibilities, it should be borne in mind as well that the socio-economic issues 
referred to are unique in that they are competition related, more particularly merger 
related. They arise within the merger considerations and therefore need to be dealt with 
when issues of competition are being considered. It would be inappropriate to have these 
issues dealt with by another authority as it means they would have to wear competition 
garments to understand the relationship and be able to deal with them113• 
The primary predicament is that of striking the relevant balance. South Africa's 
competition authority needs to strike a fme balance between competition and public 
interest, since if the impact of a decision on employment or black ownership is ignored, 
110 Ibid 
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its credibility and legitimacy will come under fire114. David Lewis remarked in 
September 2002 in a speech to the International Competition Network Merger Working 
Group said that 
'The competition authorities have, in my view, succeeded in striking 
a balance between public interest and competition, and have not fallen prey 
to seductive arguments in relation to public interest issues.' 115 
The public interest provisions in South African competition law are rightfully 
placed as they compete with the economic goal of economic efficiency116. I am in total 
agreement with Mr. Lewis' statement because the competition authorities have applied 
the public interest test with good sense, despite attempts by parties to persuade the 
Tribunal either to approve or prohibit a merger on disingenuous public interest grounds. 
The focus, quite correctly, has been on the impact of the transaction on competition. 
3.6 Labour's! Unions intervention. 
Critics have also stated that labour's! Unions intervention and the authorities 
support thereof perhaps reflects a socio-political approach of serving the interests of the 
employed (the "politically effective group") as opposed to promoting sustainable job 
creation in the long-run by creating efficient markets117. This may be seen by many to be 
a short term approach and lacking the element of sustainability. This policy approach is 
also criticised for interfering in efficient market outcomes. 118 A focus on the protection of 
employment, particularly where job losses are the result of efficiency-enhancing 
synergies between two merging firms, can often prevent a merged entity from being as 
efficient as it otherwise would be, resulting in less competition and knock-on effects of 
higher prices and less innovation. In other words, giving priority to the specified public 
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interest categories can serve to undermine the primary competitive analysis in mergers, 
thus harming the broad "public interest" that competition policy aims to promote119• This 
is a valid point which requires definite attention from our competition authorities. The 
pursuit of balance is proving to be an elusive one. It is a very intricate process in that in 
your pursuit of benefiting the public interest you may find that your attempts have an 
opposite effect of actually derailing the broader public interest. These means that the 
Metropolitan and the Wal-Mart mergers might potentially yield an adverse return in the 
long term labor markets. It is submitted that the conditions prohibiting retrenchments in 
the short term have two potential implications for efficiency and welfare. Firstly, not 
allowing the merging parties to allocate their labour in the most efficient manner raises 
costs for the firms. Although temporary, it increases the cost of production without any 
gains in output. 120 This is a waste of resources and decreases the productive efficiency of 
the firm. If these costs are passed on to consumers, this raises prices, which reduces the 
allocative efficiency and consumer surplus benefits of the merger121; Secondly, the 
retrenchment or re-employment condition is essentially protecting jobs that will 
inevitably be lost anyway, the costs incurred in retaining redundant employees is akin to 
an indirect tax of sorts on the owners of the firm. As firm's profits are distributed 
amongst a wide range of groups, including pension funds, households, individuals and 
tax transfers, the distributional effect of this distortion may be far reaching.122Thus the 
retrenchment or re-employment conditions are protecting jobs in the short run, 
redistributing wealth to labour at the expense of consumers and the various recipients of 
rents from the firm. 123 
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3. 7 Cost implications of public interest factors. 
To illustrate this point we will focus on the Wal-Mart merger. In this case the 
merging parties agreed to an amount that is somewhere in the region of R200 million 
development fund to develop local suppliers. This was to address the concern of local 
procurement. It is submitted that from an economic perspective this could be an 
effective tax.124 The implication is that a tax inevitably increases costs for firms, how 
these costs is passed on depends on a number of factors amongst other things the 
elasticties of demand. 125 Consumers may carry a disproportionately large burden of the 
tax. 
3.8 Unnecessary time delays caused by Public interest factors 
Some have complained about what they refer to as unnecessary delays caused by 
considering these non-economic issues especially where economic issues are absent, for 
example in the Wal-mar/Massmart merger. Longer periods are needed for proper 
assessment of competition factors with simultaneously conducting a public interest 
. . d a1 . 126 mqwry an an ys1s. 
Conclusion 
In a nutshell the criticism that has been levelled mostly on the Competition 
authorities as it pertains to section 12 A (3) 'is that the pendulum has swung too far in 
the direction of public interest' .127 Furthermore it appears that the government has in the 
recent past over-stepped their bounds of their legislative mandate by treading on the 
spheres of other legislation. It was also argued that the competition authorities are not 
the right forum to consider public interest provisions because they do not have the 
necessary skill and expertise. We considered the Wal-Mart merger extensively and 
found that the competition authorities in fact erred by treading upon the territory of the 
1241bid 
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labour relations Act and in that regard violated section 3 of the Competition Act. We 
also considered the competition implications of over-focusing on public interest 
provision and lastly the likelihood of adverse cost implications that could have a 
negative bearing on consumers. It appears that the criticism levelled against the 
competition authorities as it pertains to Section 12 A (3) is certainly valid and that more 
strides should be taken to ensure that a proper balance is struck and that proper forums 
are used to address public interest concerns. With that said the competition authorities 
have shown a relentless commitment to striking the right balance and budging in to 
aggressive lobbying from government and unions. It is submitted that the competition 




Will evaluate whether or not section 12 A (3) of the Competition Act is achieving its 
intended purpose 
4. Introduction 
This particular chapter will evaluate whether or not the competition authorities 
have succeeded in fulfilling the objectives of the Act as it pertains to section 12 A (3), 
by analyzing the cases that have come before them. 
4.1 Divergent views 
There are some who hold the view that public interest is not considered 
adequately by competition authorities. It has been expressed that public interest has not 
received sufficient attention and prominence in merger evaluation in the application of 
the South African competition legislation, "This suggests that public interest has 
somewhat been a neglected step-child in treatment compared to the more attractive and 
accepted competition evaluation that competition authorities find comfortable"128• It 
was further suggested that, albeit indirectly, the application of public interest provisions 
embedded in the Act have not been responsive to the circumstances of the broader 
developmental needs of society. 129However an assessment of Tribunal merger decisions 
from 1999 to 2009 shows that public interest has been and continues to be considered.130 
4.2 Early decision making by the Competition Tribunal 
It seemed to suggest that where a public interest consideration was in the 
jurisdiction or sphere of another governmental agency, the role ofthe competition 
128 TN Njisane, The rise of Public Interest: Recent high profile mergers, Public Interest Law Gathering. 1 




authorities should be secondary to those agencies and statutes.131 This is illustrated by 
the merger between Shell and black empowerment oil company Tepco.132 The Tribunal 
dismissed the recommendation of the Commission that, inter alia, the deal be conditional 
on Tepco remaining an independent company, jointly controlled by Thebe and Shell. 
The Commission had indicated that it had included the proposed condition because by 
removing Tepco as an independent participant in the petroleum industry would, from a 
public interest perspective, hinder the 'ability of a firm controlled by historically 
advantaged individuals from becoming competitive'. The Tribunal analysed these 
proposed conditions, and reached the conclusion that they were not appropriate. The 
Tribunal went on to caution the Commission that it 'should be extremely careful when, 
in the name of supporting historically disadvantaged investors, it intervenes in a 
commercial decision by such as (sic) investor'. 133 The Tribunal concluded that the 
conditions constrained not only SSA as the acquirer, but also the historically 
disadvantaged target. To the extent that it constrained their capital raising options, it 
could condemn firms controlled by historically disadvantaged persons to the margins of 
the economy. The Department of Minerals and Energy Affairs (D:ME) made 
submissions regarding conditions to be imposed on the merging parties. In particular, it 
requested that the seller, Thebe, be given a right of first refusal in relation to Shell SA's 
upstream refining activities should it consider disposing of all or part of its investments 
at this level of the supply chain. The Commission argued that it had to be guided by the 
public interest and enforce public policy, and what might be good for Tepco might not 
be good for South Africa and its empowerment objectives. The Tribunal referred in this 
case to the Employment Equity Act, the Skills Development Act and the Petroleum 
Charter as the more appropriate legislative instruments and cautioned the Commission 
on its role in pursuing its public interest mandate in an 'over-zealous manner lest they 
damage precisely those interests that they seek to protect. 
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This decision is an indication that initially the competition authorities were 
reluctant to be aggressive with regard to the implementation of public interest. The 
effect of this case would have meant that the competition authorities are secondary to 
other governmental institutions with regard to public interest factors mentioned in the 
Act. Such a limitation would have countered the governmental objectives of attempting 
to use competition law as an agent of imposing public interest factors. 
Anglo American Holdings Ltd ("Anglo") and Kumba Resources Ltd 
("Kumba"). 134In its decision the Tribunal first analysed the competition effects of the 
transaction, and concluded that the transaction would not substantially lessen or prevent 
competition. The Industrial Development Corporation ("IDC") intervened in the case. 
This was a long-running case, in which competition and public interest issues were 
exhaustively examined. Insofar as public interest issues were concerned, the intervener, 
the IDC, argued forcefully that the merger should be prohibited on public interest 
grounds. Referring to the section dealing with the purpose of the Act, the IDC ·argued 
that the merger would not be compatible with tpe purpose set out in s2(f) of the Act, 
being "to promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership 
stakes ofhistorically disadvantaged person." The IDC argued that Kumba was a 
strategic asset, and that were Kumba to fall under the sway of Anglo, one would not 
only not be promoting a greater spread of ownership, as set out above, but one would be 
doing the opposite, given that Anglo already had a large share of the economy. 
The tribunal declined the IDC' s interpretation of the Act. The Tribunal reached 
the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to suggest that if the merger went 
ahead it would preclude the growth of ownership in Kumba by historically 
disadvantaged persons. The Tribunal therefore concluded that the transaction was not 
against Lhe public interest, nor was it a..Tlti-competitive, and therefore approved the 
merger subject to the condition that prohibited information sharing. 
The early decisions on public interest might suggest that public interest was not 
adequately considered by the competition authorities. It might have appeared that public 
interest did not receive sufficient attention and prominence in merger evaluation in the 
134 Case No. 46/LM/Jun02 
application of the South African competition legislation. The early decision making 
justified the view 'that public interest has somewhat been a neglected step-child in 
treatment compared to the more attractive and accepted competition evaluation that 
competition authorities find comfortable' 135• 
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It can be argued that the initial application of public interest provisions 
embedded in the Act were not responsive to the circumstances of the broader 
developmental needs of society. They were restricted and lacked a dynamic element to 
them in that they refused to be creative in addressing public interest issues. They elected 
rather to assume a secondary position and delegate their statutory responsibilities to 
other institutions which frustrated the policy of the government to utilize competition 
law as a change agent. 
There has however been a shift. Recent merger decisions by the Tribunal have 
once again highlighted the importance of public interest considerations in merger 
analysis. The Tribunal's decisions in the Metropolitan Holdings Limited and Momentum 
Group Limited and notably the Wal-Mart Stores Inc and Massmart Holdings Limited 
highlight the resurgence of public interest in merger evaluation. 136 The public interest 
provision has come to the fore because of the cases mentioned, in particular the Wal-
Mart merger. 
4.3 Employment Conditions 
In the period 1999 to 2009 the Competition Tribunal considered approximately 
658 large mergers and although very few turned on public interest over the relevant 
period various public interest factors have been considered by the Tribunal.137It is also 
interesting to note that employment consideration accounts for the highest proportion 
followed by considerations of impact on competitiveness of small business (including 
those owned or managed by previously disadvantaged persons). Consideration of impact 
on a particular sector or region has largely followed a declining trend with very few 
135 TN Njisane, The rise of Public Interest: Recent high profile mergers, Public Interest Law Gathering. 1 




mergers in the early 2000's.138 This is to be expected in South Africa because the issue 
of unemployment continues to be a problem. If competition authorities are to address the 
broader developmental needs of society then of necessity the issue of employment will 
be number one on the needs. Any merger that affects the issue of employment would 
require the competition authorities to take action as the competition act empowers them 
within the ambit of their powers. As the economy failed employment consideration was 
once again back on the agenda. From 2008 onwards, there was an upward trend in the 
consideration of public interest and this coincides with the global economic recession139. 
This showed responsiveness by competition authorities to broader socio-economic needs 
ofthe country. 
The Metropolitan Holdings Limited and Momentum Group Limited 140 illustrates 
this point. The merger gave rise to one public interest consideration, namely the loss of 
employment. The Competition Tribunal, without prompting from government but at the 
insistence of labour, was willing to extensively address the regulation of labour on the 
basis of it being in the public;: interest to do so. In this case, the merging parties initia;ly 
proposed to limit the number of merger related job losses to 1000 in the first three years 
following the implementation of the merger. The Competition Tribunal approved the 
merger subject to the restriction that, with the exception of senior managers, no 
retrenchments should occur as a result of the merger for a period of two years from the 
effective date of the transaction. Moreover, it held that redundancy concerns cannot be 
addressed through "soft" initiatives such as re-skilling and redeployment as these 
conditions are, in its experience, largely ineffective. In this instance, the Tribunal 
responded by elevating the status of employment as a public interest issue to such an 
extent that even a pro-competitive merger could be prohibited if the effect of the 
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The Walmart-Massmart merger142raised ample public interest factors. One of the 
factors that were raised was the issue of employment. It was argued that the effect on 
employment may not only be felt by those employed by Massmart, but may also extend 
to those whose jobs may be threatened as a result ofthe merger. The effects could 
potentially include conditions of employment artd a decrease of unions' collective 
bargaining rights. On the maintenartce of employment, the Tribunal had ordered that the 
merged entity must when employment opportunities become available, give preference 
to the 503 employees retrenched in June 2010. However, the CAC ordered that these 
employees must be reinstated as it found that the retrenchment of these workers was 
sufficiently related to the merger. Other employment related conditions imposed by the 
CAC included a monitorium on retrenchments based on the merged entity's operational 
requirements for a period of two years; artd the merged entity must honour existing 
labour agreements artd current practice of bargaining with SACCA WU (the largest 
representative union). This further proves that section 12 A (3) of the Competition Act 
is attempting to meet its objectives, in particular as it pertains to employment. 
Since the Metropolitan/ Momentum merger in 2010, there has been a marked 
shift in the competition authorities' approach to mergers that give rise to possible 
retrenchments. The Commission now consistently requires parties to provide detailed 
information regarding the exact number and skills-level of arty employees that may be 
retrenched as a result of a merger. It has become common practice for conditions that 
cap retrenchments, both in respect of number and skills-level, to be imposed, even when 
the number of affected employees is very low. Conditions limiting retrenchments to as 
little as 10 or 14 employees have been imposed in recent months.143 
In addition, in the Primeprac/ Murray & Roberts merger and the Reutech/ SAAB 
Grintek Defence merger, pa..rties were required to provide practical support to affected 
employees such as counselling, assistartce with administrative issues arising from the 
termination of employment, and the preparation of curricula vitae. The parties in the 
Reutech/ SAAB Grintek Defence merger were also required to establish a R 1 million 
142 Case no: 11 0/CAC/Julll & 111/CAC/Julll 
143 Janine Simpson, Webber Wentzel, Recent Trends In Merger Conditions Imposed By South African 
Competition Authorities. Last Updated: 20 November 2013, Accessed on 17 November 2014 
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employee training fimd. In the Glencore/ Xstrata merger, in addition to imposing a 
limitation on retrenchments, the parties are required to engage with affected employees 
and trade unions before announcing any unskilled or semi-skilled retrenchments, and to 
make R 10 000 available per affected unskilled or semi-skilled employee for training 
and re-skilling.144 
4.4 Assessment mergers that may impact on national champions and a particular 
sector and region 
Iscor Limited and Saldahna Steel (Pty) Limited145 the facts of the case were 
previously discussed in chapter 2 of this paper. This case saw the approval of a merger 
which was likely to lessen competition, as a prohibition would have resulted in even dire 
consequences. The merger was approved based on a public interest consideration. The 
failing firm defense raised by the parties outweighed these potential effects. This aspect 
of the merger indeed highlights the issue of competition policy being part of a suite of 
economic instruments used by government to achieve its economic development 
. • 146 Imperatives 
The Iscor Limited merger with Saldahna steel is a clear indication that section 12 
A (3) of the Competition Act is not a neglected step child that is often ignored. In this 
merger an otherwise failing merger or anti-competitive merger was rescued by the 
public interest considerations. It is clear that had the merger not been approved a whole 
region would have suffered loss in terms of unemployment and the loss of economic 
activity. It can be said that section 12 A (3) of the competition Act gives the Act a dual 
effect in that it facilitates 'traditional' competition and also has a developmental edge to 
it. Furthermore it is submitted that the decision of the tribunal to approve the merger 
displays the competition authorities' commitment to respond to the broader needs of 
society. 
144 Ibid 
145 Case no: 67/LM/DecOl 
146 Ibid 
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4.5 Public interest concerns re: the ability of small businesses or firms controlled by 
historically disadvantaged persons to become competitive. 
It is interesting to note that the assessment of small business considerations, 
including those owned or managed by historically disadvantaged persons had not beert 
raised in the many mergers considered by the Tribunal.147 This was until recently, in 
particular the Wal-Mart148 merger where the plight of small business and the previously 
disadvantaged was considered. The public interest concerns raised were the effects that 
the merger would have on employment; distribution and retail sectors; and the ability of 
small businesses or firms controlled by historically disadvantaged persons to become 
competitive. 
It was argued that the effect on employment may not only be felt by those 
employed by Massmart, but may also extend to those whose jobs may be threatened as a 
result of the merger. The primary concern was that due to Walmart's global purchasing 
powers, which dwarf those of Massmart, the merged firm would be able to source cheap 
imports, thereby diverting some of Massmart' s procurement away from local suppliers 
to imports, and displacing local. 
"As a result and 'Given Wal-Mart's size and expertise ... the proposal 
for a condition which would seek to enhance the participation of South 
African small and medium size producers in particular, in global value 
chains which are dominated by Wal-Mart so as to prevent job losses, at the 
least, and, at best, to increase both employment and economic activity of 
these businesses protected under s 12 A must form part of the considerations 
which this Court is required to be taken into account in considering a 
merger of this nature ... This flows from the model of competition law chosen 
by the legislature and in particular as set out in s 12 A. It also forms part of 
the mandate given to the Tribunal and, on appeal, to this Court when faced 
with the inquiry as to whether a merger should be approved. "149 
147 TN Njisane, The rise of Public Interest: Recent high profile mergers, Public Interest Law Gathering. 1 
- 24 Page www. africanlii.org, accessed on 15 May 2014 
148 Case nos: 110/CAC/Julll & 111/CAC/Julll 
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The Wal-Mart deal is without a doubt the most prominent case on section 12 A 
(3) of the Competition Act. It showed the government's commitment to address the 
broader needs of society such as unemployment and the plight of small businesses. The 
case received widespread coverage from the media and from potential investors. Many 
government institutions and ministries were directly involved in the proceedings which 
showed a commitment by the government to employ the Competition Act as a tool to 
address the broader needs of society. 
The outcome of the case shows the impact of section 12 A (3) because through 
this provision, workers that were retrenched in anticipation of the merger were reinstated 
and the cause of small businesses was championed and protected. Not only that but the 
competition authorities treaded on somewhat dangerous waters by protecting the rights 
of unions. This attracted much criticism and outrage from certain competition experts. 
Pioneer-Pannar merger150was also another interesting case that showed the 
importance of section 12 A (3) of the Competition Act. In this merger the CAC held that 
the absence of the merger would likely see the decline and ultimately the demise of 
Pannar and the loss of its resources. Combining Pannar and Pioneer would however, 
result in an increase in competition for market leader Monsanto 
The CAC's conditions of approval included that the parties had to establish an 
International Research and Technology Hub in SA to improve expertise in crops 
important to the country, and food security in Africa. Pioneer intended to invest up to 
R62 million by 2017. In addition, they had to be involved in spreading know-how 
amongst developing farmers to increase overall productivity, profitability and security. 
Pioneer has committed R20 million over the next 6 years to foster such partnerships and 
collaborations. The merged entity would also be obliged to make available the Africa 
genetic maize material public institutions for research and deveiopment, and to potential 
competitors identified by the CAC for breeding programs for use in South Africa.151 
150 113/CAC/NOV1 1 
151 Nkomo M and VanWyk M, Public interest criteria in mergers-protectionist measures? 6th Annual 
Conference on Competition Law, Economics and Policy, 6 & 7 September 2012, 
http://www.compcom.co.za, Accessed on 26 November 201 4 
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These conditions have the implication of increasing South Africa's research 
capacity as it pertains to agriculture and also improves expertise in the agricultural 
sector. This illustrates the impact of section 12 A (3) in bringing about economic reform 
for many South Africans and small businesses. Furthermore the CAC's conditions to the 
approval shows that the public interest factors in merger cases are being used more often 
to promote the purposes of the Competition Act especially to foster effective 
competitiveness of smaller firms and businesses through investment in research, 
education, skills and training and to maintain local industry and expertise152. The focus 
has gone from simply attracting foreign direct investment to what foreign direct 
investment can do for South Africa. Foreign direct investment in South Africa is viewed 
as beneficial only when it achieves certain policy aims.153 
4.5.1 The implications of the 'Val-Mart/Massmart merger, re: small businesses 
Wal-Mart plays a large and ever-growing role in the U.S. economy. As of 
January 31,2007, Wal-Mart operated more than 3,400 U.S. Wal-Mart stores along with 
more than 550 Sam's Club locations. Wal-Mart is the largest private employer in the 
United States, with 1.3 million employees, and the largest retailer in the United States. 
In 2004, Wal-Mart handled 6.5 percent of U.S. Furthermore Wal-Mart is the top U.S. 
seller of apparel, groceries, and music, among other products, and is the top retailer in 
most states154. 
The Walmart merger has increased export opportunities for emerging South 
African wine markets under its developing wine programme. Wine makers have gained 
access into the Chinese and the US Market. According to Massmart, the 19 participating 
brands have sold almost 17000 bottles locally since the launch of the programme in 
March 2012. It is reported that_all the brands are in the Makro shops and selected Game 
stores. Participants in this programme received consuiting advice on issues such as 
152 Marumo Nlmmo and Magdaleen VanWyk, Public interest criteria in mergers-Protectionist measures, 
Paper presented at the 6th Annual Conference on Competition Law, Economics and Policy, 6 & 7 
September 20 12, http:/ www. compcom. co. za accessed on 26 November 2014 
153 Abigail Machine, Public interest and merger control in South Africa: The Walmart case revisited. 
Article submitted to the Department of Law at the University of Cape Town. http://africanantitrust.com. 
accessed on 18 January 20 14 
154 Basker Emek 'The causes and consequences of Walmart's growth' (2007) Journal of economic 
perspective, 179 
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customer analysis, packaging and pricing. Getting the wines from the farms to the stores 
was the biggest challenge and Massmart provides logistics support. Abigail Machine 
states that this reinforces the structure that the court sought from the merging parties to 
clearly indicate how they were going to work with small enterprises to ensure the 
development fund produced the desired results. Whilst the merger is benefitting from 
local procurement, the small and medium enterprises are benefitting from engaging with 
a global player which puts them on a global map by engaging with their products both 
locally and internationally.155 
Furthermore Walmart commenced farming projects, contracting with farmers in 
the Limpopo region whereby the corporation purchases produce from these farmers, as 
well as providing training, mentoring and assistance with finance and business 
opportunities. It introduced a direct farming project in South Africa and aims to source 
30% of its produce via this project, connecting some 1500 farmers to the group's value 
chain by 2016. This is an estimate of how the project is intended to grow but the good 
news is that these small busip.esses are already engaged by W almart. This follows th~ 
conditions of the merger. Walmart has its foundation in South Africa which donated 100 
fully equipped mobile kitchens to the 94+ school projects for Madiba, for use in under-
resourced schools. It is making a commitment to making meaningful contributions to the 
country, which goes beyond consumer benefits. 156 
A programme call 'empowering women together' was established to help very 
small to medium sized enterprises run by women with the aim of integrating them into 
Walmart's supply chain. The programme was aimed at all African women from the 
participating countries including South Africa. An exclusive website aimed at 
showcasing women entrepreneurs from the nine participating countries was launched 157• 
In the W almart merger the competition authorities have managed to achieve the 
objectives of the Act for societal development, in particular as it relates to small 
155 Machine A, Public interest and merger control in South Africa: The Walmart case revisited. Article 
submitted to the Department of Law at the University of Cape Town. http://africanantitrust. com, accessed 
on 18 January 2014 
156 Ibid 
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businesses and the previously disadvantaged. The competition authorities have to be 
commended for this. 
4.6 Importance of public interest provisions 
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Public interest considerations weigh more heavily in developing countries than in 
developed countries because of the greater use of industrial policy in developing 
economies. It is often pointed out that a competition statute that simply ignores the 
impact of its decisions on employment or on securing or a greater spread on black 
ownership (in the case of South Africa) would greatly discredit competition 
authorities.158 The case law that has been discussed shows that South African 
competition authorities have not ignored the impact of their decision on employment and 
redistribution of resources. 
In South Africa there seems to be consensus between various interest groups that 
there is a need for public interest consideration in merger policy in South Africa. I 
concur with this view noting that the South African competition legislation was 
designed, by the democratically elected government of 1994, as part of a suite of policy 
instruments aimed at the achievement economic development imperatives and 
addressing the socio-economic ills deriving from previous regimes. As such there is a 
need for a competition policy that is responsive, as has been demonstrated, to the 
broader socio-economic needs of society. However the point of divergence between 
various interest group is the level at which public interest ought to be considered in 
merger proceeding. It is the view of government that public interest should be given a 
more prominent placing in merger review and that the Competition Act "seeks to 
harness the power of competition to the broader developmental needs of our society"159 
This view has been met with concern by competition practitioners and agencies 
alike with some warning that competition policy alone cannot be used to address the 
developmental needs of the country. 160 I agree with this view, however it has to be said 
that the competition policy is an important means of bringing about developmental 
158 TN Njisane, The rise of Public Interest: Recent high profile mergers, Public Interest Law 




progress. Public interest has not yet trumped competition considerations, the approach 
adopted by the Tribunal has generally been both in line with the original motivation and 
sound practice.161Competition authorities in their application of section 12 A (3}have 
displayed commendable discretion and have not been led astray by zeal, though there are 
many who disagree with this view. 
If one looks back at the body of case law since 1999, it is apparent that the 
competition authorities have applied the public interest test with good sense, despite 
attempts by parties to persuade the Tribunal either to approve or prohibit a merger on 
public interest grounds. The focus, quite correctly, has been on the impact of the 
transaction on competition, where again the competition authorities have applied a 
reasoned approach to the evidence before them. 162 
Although as David Lewis, Chairperson of the Competition Tribunal, remarked in 
September 2002 in a speech to the International Competition Network Merger Working 
Group, 
'I readily concede that public interest considerations weigh more 
heavily in developing countries than they do in developed countries' for a 
number of reasons, including firstly that 'it is widely accepted that there is a 
greater role for industrial policy, for targeting supported strategically 
selected sectors or interest grounds, in developing that in developed 
countries '163. 
He continued that 
'The primacy of the competition evaluation is secured by the 
structure of the Act which p rovides that the competition evaluation is 
completed as the prior step in the decision making process and, hence, that 
161 James Hodge, Sha' ista Goga, Tshepiso Moahloli, PUBLIC INTEREST PROVISIONS IN THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN COMPETITION ACT-A CRITICAL REVIEW Competition Policy, Law and 
Economics Conference 2009, http://www.compcom.co.za, accessed on 19 November 2014 
162 Lesley Morphet Norton Rose Fulbright South Africa, South Africa: South African Competition Law 
And Public Interest Last Updated: 17 May 2007, www.mondaq.com. accessed on 17 October 2014 
163 TN Njisane, The rise of Public Interest: Recent high profile mergers, Public Interest Law 
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The competition authorities have, in my view, succeeded in striking a balance 
between public interest and competition, and have not fallen prey to seductive arguments 
in relation to public interest issues.165 
I am in total agreement with David Lewis's words. Competition authorities have 
shown an unwavering attempt to strike a· balance between the traditional competition 
core values and the socially dynamic considerations of public interest. They have been 
zealous in their quest of implementing the policy of the government as per their original 
mandate. Section 12 A (3) is an important vehicle in striking this important balance and 
of late has been at the forefront in ensuring that the Competition Act achieves its social 
objectives. Section 12 A (3) ensures that the Act remains socially relevant and enlarges 
the scope of its range, because the implications of merger decisions that take into 
account public interest provisions have a direct effect and a more pungent influence on 
ordinary employees, small businesses and the historically disadvantaged. It is submitted 
that section 12 A (3) has the effect of balancing the competition field, albeit slightly. 
When public interest considerations are taken into account it means that smaller 
businesses stand a better chance of emerging from obscurity and thriving and thereby 
ensuring that they can disrupt the market and enter into different markets which will in 
tum increase competition, which is the primary objective of the competition Act. 
Section 12 A (3) has played a pivotal role in increasing the profile of the 
competition authorities. It may be accused of playing to the gallery, however one cannot 
deny the fact that it has played an important role in the issues that affect ordinary South 
Africans. It is also worth noting that not all mergers turn on public interest issues. This 
means that public interest do not over-intrude into the realm of 'real' competition 
analysis. Section 12 A (3) is bringing about a paradigm shift in terms of how 
competition analysis is conducted. Section 12 A (3) has re-defined the way we conduct 
merger analysis in the South African context, because of its socially responsive nature. 
164 Ibid 
165 Lesley Morphet Norton Rose Fulbright South Africa, South Africa: South African Competition Law 
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As a result South Africa may be classified as a success story of the development 
and enforcement of competition law and policy in developing countries. South Africa's 
law and policy demonstrate that it is possible to find a balance between the core focus on 
efficiency and broader public interest objectives which are of particular concern to 
developing countries166 
Conclusion 
Sixteen years after the Act has been promulgated, countless advances have been 
made by the competition authorities in promoting competition policy in South Africa 
and furthering the objectives ofthe Act. The competition authorities have played a 
pivotal role in transforming an economy inherited in 1994 that was rigid, protected, 
locked up in inefficient institutions, highly monopolised and concentrated. Conditions 
imposed by the competition authorities in recent merger approvals have raised concerns 
that interests advanced by third parties during the merger proceedings are obtaining 
undue prominence in merger consideration, and this has tainted the independence with 
which the competition authorities are viewed as exercising their public interest 
mandate.167 In combination, this suggests that, at present, the competition authorities 
have had varying degrees of success in terms of striking a balance of promoting 
competition effectively and also giving effect to the public interests objectives of the 
Act. However one cannot question the competition authorities' commitment to fulfil 
their public interest obligations in terms of Section 12 A (3). The various case law that 
has been referred to in this chapter is a clear indication of that growing commitment to 
bringing about social reform t."'rrough competition law. 
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The fmal chapter will consider how certain jurisdictions have included and 
applied public interest provisions in their competition law. This will be done by way of a 
comparative analysis of certain Jurisdictions that have public interest provisions in their 
competition policy. It should be noted that not many countries make use of competition 
law to achieve their social objectives. As James hopes et al observes that in most other 
jurisdictions that are strong reference points for South Africa's own competition law, 
there is either no public interest component or the public interest decision lies outside of 
the Competition Authorities. It may either reside with another regulator or a Minister. 
The result is that the public interest decision is less a process of a careful weighing up 
competition and public interest effects, and rather a process of determining whether a 
negative public interest is substantial or not, trumping the competition assessment 
regardless or sometimes simply ignoring public interest in the event that it is 
positive.168 As we have previously noted in chapter 1 of this paper that most developed 
countries show a shift away from the use of their competition laws to promote broad 
public interest objectives and focus instead on creating a framework for achieving the 
efficient use of resources and protecting freedom of economic activity in the market.169 
Competition law is often kept pure from other external considerations. This means that 
competition law in this instance would only deal with the traditional analysis of 
competition. As a result of the aforesaid this essay will only consider certain 
jurisdictions. 
5,1 Comparative evaluation. 
In foreign jurisdictions such as Canada, Australia, the USA and the EU there is 
no separate public interest under their law, however the competition authorities in those 
168 Authors: James Hodge, Sha'ista Goga, Tshepiso Moahloli, Public interest provisions in the South 
African competition Act- A critical review, Competition Policy, Law and Economics Conference 2009, 
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countries do not act in a vacuum and are influenced by broader public interest and 
political factors 170. Their legal framework does not necessarily extend to a public interest 
analysis that is independent from a competitive one171 • In the EU for instance it 
appreciates the fact that there may be situations in which the investigation of a merger 
may be justifiable on grounds of wider public interest than its detrimental effect on 
competition172. Article 21(4) of the EUMR appreciates that member states may have a 
legitimate interest in investigating a merger for reasons other than issues of competition 
and makes provision for the issue of a European intervention notice in such cases. A 
cursory look at public interest in merger regimes internationally shows that a number of 
countries do give credence to public interest however this is strictly limited to certain 
sectors. 173 
5.1.1 United Kingdom 
An important feature of the merger provisions in the enterprise Act is that the 
secretary of state should not be involved in individual cases and that decisions should. be 
taken by the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission. Competition 
analysis in a normal merger cases are carried out by specialist competition authorities. 
Public interest consideration in mergers in the United Kingdom is primarily the domain 
of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and this is limited to the following: 
National security which includes public security; Plurality of media; and Stability of the 
UK fmancial system. 174 This clearly shows that in the UK the policy is for minimal 
intervention by the state with regard to the aforementioned sectors. What is to be noted 
is that these sectors and industries are of paramount importance to the state and to the 
well-being of not only the economy but the well-being of the UK. 
The media is important with regard to the preserving of free and fair flow of 
information and as a result of its importance needs to be protected and therefore has to 
170John Campbell, Robert Lech, Charles Simkins, David Unterhalter and Jerome Wilson, Martin Brassey. 
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allow for the intervention by the secretary of state for Trade and industry. Media public 
interest considerations apply to both newspaper, broadcast and cross-media mergers and 
assess specific issues outlined in the Enterprise Act 2002. This assessment is conducted 
by the Office of Communication in partnership with the Office of Fair Trading which 
largely focusses on the competition effects of the proposed merger. In the case of 
newspaper mergers the following has to be ascertained to determine the public interest 
impact of the merger: The need for accurate presentation of news in newspapers; The 
need for freedom of expression; and The need for, to the extent that is reasonable and 
practicable, a sufficient plurality ofviews expressed in newspapers in the UK.175 
The broadcasting and cross media test determines whether the following are 
relevant to a consideration ofthe merger: The need for sufficient plurality of persons 
with control of the media firms serving that particular audience in relation to every 
different audience in the UK or a particular area of the UK; The need for the availability 
of a wide range of high quality broadcasting that appeals to varying tastes and interests; 
and the need for people with control of media to have a genuine commitment to the 
attainment ofthe objectives set out in section 319 ofthe Communications Act 2003 such 
as due impartiality of news, taste and decency. It is submitted that the public interest 
criteria to be applied in media mergers is clear and gives guidance on what is to be 
considered when the relevant body conducts 176 
The Competition authorities' powers are limited to assessing competition issues 
in all mergers and if there is any 'relevant or special merger situation' then a public 
interest assessment will be done177• This 'relevant or special merger situation' arises 
where the merger may lead to two or more enterprises ceasing-to exist or the creation 
and/or enhancement of at least a 25% share of the supply of any good or service or in a 
substantial pa..rt oft.h.e UK post-merger. In such situations, the Secretary of State issues a 







Furthermore the Enterprise Act 2002 gives the Secretary of State power to add 
new public interest considerations when the need arises and this is how .the 'stability of 
the UK fmancial system' factor came into being in 2008. This came about as a result of 
the global financial crisis that started in that very same year. Having had regard to the 
importance of the financial services sector and how instability in this sector could have a 
damaging effect on the wider economy, the Act was amended to include this sector as 
public interest. In September 2008, Lloyds TSB and Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) 
were allowed to merge into the Lloyds Banking Group, in a deal brokered by the UK 
government. For the first time since the Enterprise Act came into force in 2002, the UK 
government used its public interest powers to allow a merger which was opposed by the 
Office ofFair Trading on competition grounds (based on substantial lessening of 
competition in relation to personal current accounts, banking services for SMMEs and 
mortgages). In order for the merger to be allowed, the Secretary of State had to create a 
new public interest ground with the consent of Parliament. The Secretary of State used 
his power under section 42 of the Enterprise Act to create a new public interest ground, 
being ' maintaining the stability of the UK financial system' and forced the merger 
through on the new public interest ground without the Competition Commission having 
a chance to consider its implications for competition. This was done on the basis of 
section 45 of the Act, finding that the benefits of the merger for the stability of the UK 
fmancial system outweighed the likely anti-competitive outcomes179. The stability of the 
financial system is quite delicate to warrant periodical state intervention if the situation 
warrants such an intervention. 
5.1.2 Asia 
5.1.2.1 Japan and South Korea 
Many jurisdictions in the Asia-Pacific also have public interest provisions or at 
least some form of public interest consideration in their merger control legislation. Japan 
179 Andreas Stephan, 'Did Lloyds I HBOS Mark the Failure of an Enduring Economics Based System of 
· Merger Regulation?', July 2011, available at 
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and South Korea have also proceeded to amend their merger control legislation to enable 
special consideration of cross~ border merger that may negatively impact on their 
domestic markets180. 
5.1.2.2 China 
China has also incorporated specific provisions for public interest in their merger 
control regulation181 . These include assessing a merger's effect on national security. This 
involves a certain level of protection of domestic firms from international competition 
should the international investment be deemed to pose likely anti-competitive effects. 
Further, article 27 of the Anti-Monopoly Law provides that the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM), China's executive agency for competition, must consider a proposed 
merger's effect 'on the development of the national economy'. This essentially enjoins 
the MOFCOM to consider industrial policy factors during merger review182. 
5.1.2.3 Indonesia 
Eleanor M. Fox states in her article that Indonesia has included in their 
competition laws provisions to help bring discriminated-against or left-out majorities 
into the economic mainstream. Indonesia's competition law does so in light of a 
perception that its ethnic Indonesian majority has been prevented from business 
opportunities by cronyism and privileges on the one hand, and control by the ethnic 
Chinese minority on the other. This has resulted in the inclusion of equity objectives in 
their competition law. More than the competition law of South Africa, the competition 
law of Indonesia is infused with principles of equality of opportunity, fairness, equal 
treatment, and a leveling ofadvantage183• 
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5.1.3 Australia and New Zealand 
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission generally only considers 
merger-related efficiencies if they affect the competitiveness of a market. Non-
competition issues are usually not taken into account by the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission when deciding whether or not to grant clearance of a merger. 
The majority of the issues taken into account in merger decisions are competition issues 
including merger efficiencies and the impact ofregulation184. 
Australia and New Zealand adopt a more or less similar approach to public 
interest during merger review. They have a process of merger 'authorisation' which 
enables firms to apply to the Australian Competition Tribunal and the Commerce 
Commission respectively for an approval of mergers that are deemed anti-competitive if 
the public benefit outweighs these. Both countries do not specify what constitutes a 
public benefit however the wording of the New Zealand provision is more telling in that 
the public benefit must be directly attributable to the transaction185• 
In relation to banking Australia has adopted an approach that could be said to 
amount to an explicit prohibition of bank mergers. 186 This was occasioned by the public 
dissatisfaction over rising bank fees, branch closures and job losses. The Australian 
government has also intervened in the issue, preventing mergers between the big four 
banks until they can show that competition in fmancial services markets has increased. It 
is widely held that though not legislated, this view and general practice by competition 
authorities could be read to be protecting public interest.187 
5.1.4 United States and Canada 
Competition law, or antitrust, is often viewed as a tool to preserve market 
competition in order to provide an environment that will encourage the efficiency and 
responsiveness of business and serve the interests of consumers. The United States 
184 The European Lawyer Reference (Van Bael & Bellis). 2011. Merger Control. London, United 
Kingdom. 30 
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In the United States and Canada public interest in mergers has mainly focused on 
mergers in the media and banking sectors respectively189. Competition authorities in 
both countries have no public interest burden when assessing mergers with the exception 
of these two sectors. Even then in the US public interest analysis is the domain of the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) under section 202 (h) of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996190• 
Public interest in media mergers in the US is based on the notion of freedom of 
speech and the press and its importance for democratic rule. As such the Act limits 
ownership by any firm of stations that broadcast to more than 39% of US TV 
households for example. Further, the Act requires the FCC, in its periodic review of 
media ownership regulation must consider the three public interest goals: competition, 
diversity and localism191 • 
In Canada public interest consideration applies in bank mergers, subject to 
approval by the Minister of Finance, this stems from their potential effects on retail and 
by extension impact on consumers in general. The Minister of Finance, in determining 
the public interest, considers frrst the likely effect of a proposed merger by large banks 
on the prosperity and competitiveness of the national economy192. Moreover, the 
Minister should contemplate the increased choice of competitively priced financial 
services for all Canadians in every region of the country While bank mergers are 
allowed, legislation requires that they be subjected to a public interest assessment which 
compels parties to show the following: The possible costs and benefits to customers and 
small and medium-sized businesses, including the impact on branches, availability of 
financing, price, quality and availability of services; The timing and socio-economic 
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impact of any branch closures or alternative service delivery measures at the regional 
level, and any alternative service delivery measures that might mitigate the impact; and 
What remedial or mitigating steps in respect of public interest concerns the banks are 
prepared to take, such as divestitures, service guarantees and other commitments, and 
what measures to ensure fair treatment of those whose jobs are affected193• 
The Minister permit, as being in the public interest, a merger that has been 
approved by and meets the conditions set out by the Competition Bureau and the Office 
of the Superintendent ofFinancial Institutions, unless there are compelling reasons to 
believe otherwise 194. If a merger is denied, the Minister should make a statement to 
Parliament at the earliest opportunity to clarify the reasons for the denial. 195 
There is however a growing faction that wants the Minister of Finance's 
discretion to be removed from the merger process as a means of removing politics from 
the process. Instead, the process as set out in the guidelines - should take place, with 
proper analysis by the bodies responsible (Competition body). 
The federal government. reviews public interest issues, with the Standing Senate 
Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce and the House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Finance at times requests to conduct public hearings into the broad public 
interest issues raised by a specific merger proposal, using the Public Interest Impact 
Assessment as a key input and with the benefit of input by the Competition Bureau and 
the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions 196• 
The Public Interest Impact Assessment 
The Public Interest Impact Assessment is to include the following eight element: 
The business case and objectives of the merger; the possible costs and benefits to 
customers and small and medium-sized businesses, including the impact on branches, 
availability of financing, price, quality and the availability of services; the t iming and 
socio-economic impact of any branch closures or alternative service delivery measures 






competitiveness of the financial services sector; how the proposal would affect direct 
and indirect employment and the quality of jobs in the sector, distinguishing between 
transitional and permanent effects; how the proposal would increase the banks' ability to 
develop and adopt new technologies; what remedial or mitigating steps in respect of 
public interest concerns the banks are prepared to take, such as divestitures, service 
guarantees and other commitments, and what measures to ensure fair treatment of those 
whose jobs are affected; and the impact that the transaction may have on the overall 
structure of the industry197• Furthermore any additional issues required by the Minister 
of Finance or deemed relevant by the parties might also be included198• In essence, the 
Impact Assessment requires the parties to a merger proposal to explain the rationale for 
their proposal and the steps that could be taken to reduce any potential costs or 
concerns.199The Canadian public interest inquiry is highly politicized. 
The merger process has been plagued with controversies. At some stage (2003-
2004) the federal government refused to accept or consider the mergers of large fmancial 
institutions. The goverprnent also continues to insist on evaluating whether m~rgers are 
in the public interest rejecting the recommendation of a Senate committee that this 
evaluation be eliminated200• 
Banks view the finance minister's authority to decide whether a merger is in the 
public interest as a setback for them. Furthermore top bank executives told the Senate 
banking committee they were concerned whether any merger could pass a political 
evaluation or whether the merger evaluation process served the public interest, and 
called for greater clarity and fairness201 • 
5.1.5 Mrica 
According to Oxenham Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, Swaziland and Zambia are 
some of the jurisdictions in Africa that include some form of public interest 
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considerations as part of their competition regulation. The provisions in respect of public 
interest in these jurisdictions are mainly associated with the assessment of merger 
activity02• 
In Zambia the scope of potential factors for consideration is essentially unlimited 
including not only unemployment, exports and international competitiveness but also 
socio-economic factors as may be appropriate203• 
In Kenya public interest considerations include ex}Jorts, promoting stability or 
even obtaining a benefit for the public can be used to justify an exemption for otherwise 
anticompetitive agreements204. 
In Zimbabwe, public interest provisions also relate to promotion of small and 
medium sized enterprises, facilitation of indigenization and localisation of economic 
activities, as well as development oflocal brands into regional and international brands. 
Its provisions are similar to the ones provided for in South Africa and are shown in 
many of the Zimbabwean competition cases. E.g. when Pretoria Portland cement from 
South Africa sought to merge with Portland holding in Zimbabwe, the merger was 
approved with the condition that the acquiring South African company had to modernise 
the plant of the target in Zimbabwe and maintain it as a going concern producing cement 
in Zimbabwe. There was concern that although the merger generated a number of public 
interest benefits such as facilitating foreign direct investment and increased foreign 
exchange earnings, stakeholders from Pretoria Portland Cement might close the plant in 
Zimbabwe and supply the country from its South African Operations, hence the 
conditions imposed205 . 
5.2 South African Public interest provisions in merger proceedings 
With the beginning ofNelson Mandela's presidency in May 1994, the 
government set about democratizing South Africa socially and economically. The 
202 Oxenham J 'Balancing public interest merger considerations before Sub-Saharan competition 






agenda for economic reform included a revised competition law. It was viewed as 
important to bring about democratization in the markets because of the history of 
inequality. In the apartheid era the markets became highly concentrated, dominated by 
monopolies or cartels, while a few groups, run by prominent and wealthy business 
leaders, controlled almost all ofthe country's economy. There was, and still is, extreme 
disparity of wealth between the white minority and the excluded black community.2 06 
SA's competition law framework is, on the face of it, unique. It has been 
influenced by its apartheid history and the economic imbalances that have arisen, the 
drafters of the act specifically included public interest considerations within the purview 
of competition law and regulation in the new South Africa207. In its revised competition 
law South Africa now uses competition law not only to advance efficiency and 
consumer welfare, but also to advance the development of small and middle-sized 
businesses208• Furthermore it seeks to expand opportunities for South Africa's 
participation in world markets d) Promote small and medium sized enterprises to 
participate in the economy e) Give previously disadvantaged South Africans ownership 
right. It is trite to note that at the time the new legislation was enacted, the government 
was responding to contextual problems that needed to be solved. 209 
In South Africa section 12 A (3) of the Competition Act which deals with public 
interest provisions in a merger is a peremptory provision, meaning that it is not 
suggested that competition authorities ought to consider public interest provision. A 
public interest analysis ought to be conducted despite the outcomes of the competitive 
effects analysis. This means that it is not only considered in certain instances of 
convenience and then ignored when it is seen to be an inconvenience. In September 
2003, in its decision and reasons in the large merger between Anglo American Holdings 
Limited and Kmnba Resources Limited, the Competition Tribunal confirmed the above 
when it said that "although we have found that the merger will not lead to a substantial 
prevention or lessening of competition, we must still evaluate whether it can be 
206 Eleanor M. Fox, Equality, Discrimination, and Competition Law: Lessons from and for South Africa 





prohibited on public interest grounds ... "210. Such a feature of the Act means that section 
12 A (3) will constantly play an important role in merger proceedings. In many 
jurisdictions public interest considerations apply in certain instances. This makes section 
12 A (3) peculiar and distinct from other jurisdictions. 
5.3 Public interest 
Public interest' can be defined as referring to the 'common well-being' or 
'general welfare'211 • To be more specific with regard to merger analysis, there are some 
common issues among the different legislative provisions of competition laws that can 
fall under public interest considerations. The definition comprises issues of 
equity/fairness, protection of small business, equality of opportunity, freedom of 
economic action, decentralisation of economic decision making/power, and involvement 
of economically disadvantaged groups and so on. This is achieved by including 
employment, regional development and growth of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) etc., as areas of analysis.212 The South African competition law contains similar 
considerations in the competition Act. 
'Section 12 A (3) states that: When determining whether a merger 
can or cannot be justified on public interest grounds, the Competition 
Commission or the Competition Tribunal must consider the effect that the 
merger will have on -
(a) a particular industrial sector or region; 
(b) employment; 
(c) the ability of small businesses, or firms controlled or owned by 
historically disadvantaged persons, to become competitive; and 
(d) the ability of national industries to compete in international markets' 213 
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There is also an alarming difference as to what would be considered public 
interest in developed jurisdictions and developing jurisdictions. In developing 
jurisdictions like South Africa and other African jurisdictions emphasis is placed on the 
combating of employment through job preservation and job creation. In developed 
economies emphasis is placed on things like media and banking. Such a difference is to 
be expected because they have different socio-economic conditions and differing 
histories. This may be caused by the fact that these countries have different 
developmental aspirations which are shaped by where they are in terms of their 
developmental levels. South Africa has issues such as employment and wealth 
redistribution to address and more developed jurisdictions do not necessarily face similar 
challenges. 
The effect that a merger will have on employment has been the most significant 
public interest consideration in South African merger review to date, and is currently 
assuming a pivotal role, particularly as trade unions, in a number of cases, have been 
successful in seeking to have conditions i:t;nposed to protect employment (such as a 
moratorium on job losses for a specific period)214• 
In South Africa the issue of employment and redistribution of wealth is a maj or 
public interest consideration. My submission is evidenced by section 2 (c) of the 
Competition Act which states that one of the objectives ofthe Act is to promote 
employment and advance the social and economic welfare of South Africans and section 
2 (f) states that one of its objectives is to promote a greater spread of ownership, in 
particular to increase the ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged persons. Issues 
of employment are particularly unique and more pressing in a South African and an 
African context than in a more advanced jurisdiction such as say the UK, Canada, 
United States of America etc. 
Abigail Machine in her paper that was submitted to the UCT law school states 
that the history of South Africa makes inclusion of public interest provisions good policy 
sense as employment creation and black economic empowerment are major challenges 
to sustainable development in South Africa. She further elaborated that explicit 
214 Public interest factors as part of South African merger review, Tamara Dini, The Times (South Africa) 
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reference to these factors is thus to be expected in a significant area of policy and law 
such as the competition act.Z15Lewis emphasises that in a country such as South Africa, 
where distributional and poverty problems are at the forefront, all social and economic 
policies are expected to contribute to the alleviation of these problems and competition 
policy is not exempt from this expectation. Thus the competition act complements the 
government's efforts to improve on employment issues, support promising 
entrepreneurs, particularly those who are from a historically disadvantaged 
background. 216 
5.4 Government interference 
It is noteworthy that many jurisdictions around the world permit government 
interference in merger proceedings, however, it is often on the basis of a national 
security concern and only applied in cross-border mergers. The South African 
Competition Act is unusual in that it has provided mechanisms to resolve conflicts 
between policy and competition,. but has limited the discretionary component by placing. 
the responsibility for determining whether a merger is required for public interest 
objectives in the hand ofthe independent competition authorities217.Given the potential 
for mergers to impact on government policy objectives, many other jurisdictions 
including the UK, Germany and Canada provide a mechanism for politicians to overturn 
otherwise anti -competitive mergers under particular circumstances. One concern is that 
this leaves the competition process, which should ideally be independent, open to some 
form of government interference.218 It is submitted that political figures representing the 
government form part of stakeholders affected by competition issues. To be asked to 
judge on such matters would in most cases result in the neglect of competition issues 
that this particular stakeholder did not fmd in its favour, even though such issues 
enhanced other welfare issues. It is imperative that such duties be removed from the 
21
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government219• It is important that for policy makers or authorities applying public 
interest test to apply it in a manner which is independent from political influence and is 
transparent. It is also essential to engage the community and keep their confidence that 
public interest considerations have been objectively?20 It was learnt from experience 
that competition issues and politics could not be related if there was any intended 
achievement in this arena of competition law.Z21 Furthermore, the Government forms 
part of stakeholder group, and it would be inappropriate or rather ineffective to ask a 
stakeholder to decide what is in the best interests of other stakeholders. The independent 
competition authorities are better off adjudicating on such issues as they are separated 
from any such interests222• This means that the risk of gross governmental influence is 
limited and that the process is most likely to be uniform and possibly predictable which 
can have a positive bearing on deal flow. In South Africa government may intervene in 
merger proceedings as a party to the proceedings through its various ministries but not 
as an arbiter or a direct intervention. 
Conclusion 
Chapter five compared South African competition law to the competition law of 
other jurisdictions. What is unique about the South African competition jurisprudence is 
that it has a strong public interest bend and it seems quite unapologetic in its stance. It 
states it in the competition Act preamble, in its objectives and more specifically in 
section 12 A (3). Furthermore the fact that it has independent competition authorities, 
who consider the public interest inquiry makes it unique. It means that there is minimal 
government intervention. Furthermore it ensures that pure competition law principles are 
adhered to and not simply treaded upon in the pursuit of the public interest objectives. 
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Chapter 6 is the final chapter of this public interest discourse. It will comprise of 
a brief overview of what was considered, it will then proceed to make a few 
recommendations and then finally conclude the discourse. 
Section 12 A 3 seeks to re-address the imbalances of our past. This is done by 
ensuring that on the one hand competitiveness and efficiency are pursued, and on the 
other hand that the people who were previously denied an equal opportunity to 
participate in the economy have access to participate in the economy'. 223It is often 
argued that the inclusion of these factors in the Competition Act leads to a paradox, in 
that they are often divorced from and, at times, directly at odds with the primary 
objectives of competition law and policy. A focus on protection of employment, for 
example, particularly where job losses are the result of efficiency-enhancing synergies 
between two merging firms, can often prevent a merged entity from being as efficient as 
it otherwise would be, resulting in less competition and knock-on effects of higher prices 
and less innovation. In other words, giving priority to the specified public interest 
categories can serve to undermine the primary competitive analysis in mergers, thus 
harming the broad & public interest & that competition policy aims to promote224. 
It is submitted that in spite of South Africa' s attempt to fuse public interest 
aspiration and traditional values of competition law it has still managed to preserve well-
tested principles of competition law. This is despite the fact that these aspiration are at 
times in conflict with each other and they are often incompatible225• For example, 
mergers are prohibited if, among other things, they are likely to substantially lessen 
competition. The South African competition law falls generally within the range of 
traditional competition law whilst at same time applying a limited measure of 
affirmative action. It is further submitted by Eleanor Fox that the South African 
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competition law addresses the tension between fairness and efficiency and in almost all 
cases allows defenses based on pro-competitive and efficiency justifications. 
6.1.1 Competition authorities must contribute to poverty reduction and 
employment reduction 
In a recent OECD roundtable on competition and poverty eradication, delegates 
of competition authorities in developing countries argued that the 'political stability of 
the competition policy authorities depends to a large extent on how they are seen as 
contributing to poverty reduction and employment creation. It would be risky for them 
to state that their only target is combatting harm to competition by producers and that the 
impact of their efforts on poverty or inequality is irrelevan-r226• Section 12 A 3 ensures 
that our competition law contributes to poverty reduction and employment creation. 
Section 12 A (3) has made a significant contribution to the plight of empl~yees, 
previously disadvantaged and recently to the interests of small businesses. TheW al-
Mart merger was at the center of the latter contribution. It has led to a wic;ier 
interpretation of section 12 A (3) of the competition Act. The competition authorities 
have been a catalyst in ensuring that the interest of small businesses, employees and the 
previously disadvantaged are protected. The Wal-Mart merger has led to the 
establishment of development funds that train small businesses to be able to do business 
with Wal-Mart. 
6.1.2 The role of competition authorities should be exercised with caution and 
restraint 
In chapter 3 we discussed the criticisms that were levelled against the 
competition authorities. One of the criticisms that were imputed against them was that 
that they are taking public interest too far and that their interpretation of section 12 A (3) 
is too broad. It was stated that the public interest conditions imposed in certain recent 
high profile mergers seem to extend beyond a narrow, merger-specific application of the 
public interest objectives of the Act and are increasingly reflective of the interests of 
third party interveners in the proceedings. This raises questions as to whether the 
226 Ibid 
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competition authorities are fmding the balance between competition and public interest 
considerations that is envisaged by the Act and whether their status as "independent 
institutions to monitor competition" is being compromised by too great a focus on the 
interests of third party interveners.227 It should be noted again that the role of 
competition authorities is limited to the listed grounds in section 12 A (3) insofar as their 
merger specific. The term merger specific. was defmed in chapter 2 of this paper. In 
chapter 2 the paper discussed the fact that the role of competition authorities is to protect 
existing rights and not to create rights. This principle was extracted from the Wal-
Mart!Massmart merger. Consequently it was suggested that in developing a framework 
by which local suppliers can participate in Wal-Mart' s global value chain, the CAC 
seems to have overstepped its public interest mandate in terms of the Act. As a result, 
concerns have been raised that the conditions imposed relating to the development of 
local suppliers reflect pressure from the EDD rather than the independent exercise of the 
mandate of the Tribunal and CAC in order to give effect to objectives of the Act.228 
6.1.3 The competition authorities' role in defending the rights listed in section 12 A 
(3) secondary to other statutory and regulatory instruments 
The Act' s objectives include economic transformation and promotion of a 
greater spread of ownership. However, these objectives have a narrow scope, the 
Tribunal having taken the view in Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Tepco Petroleum (Pty) 
Ltd 66/LM/OctOl that "the role played by the competition authorities in defending even 
those aspects of the public interest listed in the Act is, at most, secondary to other 
statutory and regulatory instruments". The Tribunal has previously held, in relation to a 
proposed equity ownership condition, that this would be more appropriately pursued 
through other mechanisms (such as the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, the Skills 
Development Act 97 of 1998 and the BEE Charter).l14 Therefore the interests of the 
dti, advanced by the BEE condition, extend beyond the intended scope of the 
developmental objectives of the Act and would more appropriately have been advanced 
227 Robert Legh, Jessica Staples and Magalie Masamba, Competition Law Sibergramme 3/2012, 02 
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It is submitted that the public interest provisions in South African competition 
law are rightfully placed as they compete with the economic goal of economic 
efficiency, therefore need to be balanced whenever issues concerning mergers are 
concerned to effectively promote the goal of competition in the country. What needs to 
be guarded against is the abuse of these provisions and that public interests should only 
come into play whenthey are exceptional and should be seen within the context of the 
primary competitive assessmenr30• 
Eleanor Fox states that nations that use competition law for equality ends 
confront a distinct challenge. The law is most likely to be successful in meeting its goals 
to the extent that: (1) the legal rules and frameworks for analysis are clear; (2) the 
derogations from market-based rules are clear; and (3) decision-making is transparent 
and agency and court discretion is limited. She then goes on to state that the South 
African competition law substantially fulfills these requirements, or can easily be 
brought within their purvie~31 • I am in agreement with her observation, furthermore I 
.think South Africa is an example to other developing jurisdictions that endeavor to use 
their competition legislation to champion socio-economic reform in their respective 
economies. It must be stated that competition law has to be one of the measures that are 
used and not merely the sole measure to combat social inequality. Pure competition 
analysis should still be preserved and given its rightful place if those jurisdictions are to 
meet their goals. 
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Conclusion 
Section 12 A (3) has played an important role in ensuring that our competition 
legislation has a greater reach to the general public. It's inclusion in our competition law 
ensures that it becomes relevant to the lives of ordinary South Africans. It is the 
application of the aspirations of our government to see that wealth is re-distributed to 
ensure that "ordinary" South Africans get a share of the spoils. Furthermore employees 
now get further protection in the case of a merger that would ordinarily result in the loss 
of employment. Case law that was discussed in this essay is proof that serious inroads 
have been made by the competition authorities to protect the jobs of many South 
Africans. Furthermore, it champions the cause of small businesses and also seeks to 
enhance national institutions so that they may compete in the international arena. In its 
quest to achieve these social goals our competition authorities have still maintained the 
'traditional' analysis for mergers, which inquires whether or not a merger is likely to 
substantially lessen competition. It is submitted that the competition authorities have 
endeavored to strike the necessary balance and also to ensure that the merger process is 
apolitical and impartial. Section 12 A 3 is provision that is in line with our national 
aspirations and will continue to play a major role in the development of our economy. 
Section 12 A 3 has made a significant contribution in addressing social problems and 
South Africa's development goals. 
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